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In this paper, we tell a story about incompleteness in modal logic. The
story weaves together a paper of van Benthem [1979], “Syntactic aspects of
modal incompleteness theorems,” and a longstanding open question: whether
every normal modal logic can be characterized by a class of completely ad-
ditive modal algebras, or as we call them, V-baos. Using a first-order re-
formulation of the property of complete additivity, we prove that the modal
logic that starred in van Benthem’s paper resolves the open question in the
negative. In addition, for the case of bimodal logic, we show that there is a
naturally occurring logic that is incomplete with respect to V-baos, namely
the provability logic GLB [Japaridze, 1988, Boolos, 1993]. We also show that
even logics that are unsound with respect to such algebras do not have to be
more complex than the classical propositional calculus. On the other hand,
we observe that it is undecidable whether a syntactically defined logic is V-
complete. After these results, we generalize the Blok Dichotomy [Blok, 1978]
to degrees of V-incompleteness. In the end, we return to van Benthem’s
theme of syntactic aspects of modal incompleteness.
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1 Introduction
The discovery of Kripke incompleteness, the existence of normal modal logics that are
not sound and complete with respect to any class of Kripke frames, has been called one
of the two forces that gave rise to the “modern era” of modal logic [Blackburn et al.,
2001, p. 44]. In the Lemmon Notes of 1966, it was conjectured that all normal modal
logics are Kripke complete [Lemmon and Scott, 1977, p. 74].1 But this was not to be.
Kripke incompleteness was first demonstrated with a bimodal logic [Thomason, 1972],
shortly thereafter with complicated unimodal logics [Fine, 1974, Thomason, 1974a], and
1In fact, Wolter and Zakharyaschev [2006, p. 428] claim that much of early research in the area was
motivated by the still more optimistic Big Programme or globalist’s dream. See § 6.3 and especially
Footnote 23 for a further discussion.
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later with simple unimodal logics [van Benthem, 1978, 1979, Boolos and Sambin, 1985].
The significance of these discoveries can be viewed from several angles.
From one angle, they show that Kripke frames are too blunt an instrument to charac-
terize normal modal logics in general. More fine-grained semantic structures are needed.
From another angle, they show that the notion of derivability in a normal modal logic
with a set Σ of axioms is too weak to capture the notion of Kripke frame consequence, in
the sense where Σ  ϕ iff every Kripke frame that validates every σ ∈ Σ also validates ϕ.
A deep result of Thomason [1975a] showed such weakness to be inevitable: the standard
consequence relation for monadic second-order formulas with a single binary relation
is reducible to the Kripke frame consequence relation for modal formulas.2 Since the
former consequence relation is not recursively axiomatizable, neither is the latter.
Both of these angles on Kripke incompleteness lead to closely related questions and
lines of investigation, with slightly differing focus. As we shall see, both of these lines of
investigation will come together nicely in this paper.
1.1 The Semantic Angle
The first angle on Kripke incompleteness—the realization that Kripke frames are not
fine-grained enough for the study of normal modal logics in general—renewed interest in
the algebraic semantics for normal modal logics based on Boolean algebras with operators
(baos) [Jo´nsson and Tarski, 1951, 1952]. A bao is a Boolean algebra together with one
or more unary3 operators, i.e., unary operations ♦ such that for all elements x, y of the
algebra, ♦(x ∨ y) = ♦x ∨ ♦y, and for the bottom element ⊥ of the algebra, ♦⊥ = ⊥.
Every normal modal logic is sound and complete with respect to a bao, namely, the
Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of the logic, according to a straightforward definition of when
a modal formula is valid over a bao. Kripke incompleteness can be better understood
in light of the fact that Kripke frames correspond to baos that are complete (C), atomic
(A), and completely additive (V), or CAV-baos for short (see § 3). A bao is complete
or atomic, respectively, according to whether its Boolean reduct is complete or atomic
in the standard sense, while it is completely additive iff the following holds:
(V) for any set X of elements, if
∨
X exists, then
∨
{♦x | x ∈ X} exists and
♦
∨
X =
∨
{♦x | x ∈ X},
which in the case of a complete bao reduces to the distributivity of ♦ over arbitrary
joins. (The letter ‘V’ is intended to suggest the big join
∨
.)
Given the correspondence between Kripke frames and CAV-baos, the fact that a nor-
mal modal logic is not the logic of any class of Kripke frames means that it is not the logic
of any class of CAV-baos. To put these points in more algebraic terms: normal modal
2To be more specific, Thomason [1975a] showed that such second-order formulas can be translated
into unimodal formulas in such a way that a second-order formula ϕ is a consequence of a set Σ of
second-order formulas over standard second-order structures iff the translation t(ϕ) of ϕ is valid in
every Kripke frame that validates {t(σ) | σ ∈ Σ} ∪ {δ} for a fixed modal formula δ.
3Jo´nsson and Tarski considered operators of higher arity, but we will consider only unary operators.
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logics correspond to varieties of baos, and Kripke incompleteness is the phenomenon
that not every variety of baos can be generated as the smallest variety containing some
class of CAV-baos. The last point is underscored by the dramatic Blok Dichotomy [Blok,
1978]: a variety of baos is either uniquely generated by the CAV-baos it contains (the
associated modal logic is strictly Kripke complete) or else there are continuum-many
other varieties of baos that contain exactly the same CAV-baos (other modal logics
that are valid over exactly the same Kripke frames).
From this algebraic perspective, a series of natural questions arises: what happens
if we drop or weaken one or more of the properties C, A, and V? Do we thereby
obtain distinct notions of completeness for normal modal logics? Can we represent the
resulting baos with some kind of frames with richer structure than Kripke frames? Does
incompleteness persist even if we retain only one of the properties C, A, or V? Does the
analogue of the Blok Dichotomy hold if we drop one or more of C, A, or V?
These questions and the general landscape of sub-Kripkean notions of completeness
from an algebraic perspective were the subject of the PhD research of Litak [2004, 2005a,
2005b, 2008]. As it turns out, none of the following notions of completeness are equivalent
to any of the others: completeness with respect to atomic baos (A-baos), complete
baos (C-baos), baos that admit residuals (T -baos), atomic and completely additive
baos (AV-baos), complete and completely additive baos (CV-baos), and CAV-baos.
A rich hierarchy of different notions of completeness thereby comes into view. As for
the representation question: Dosˇen [1989] showed that CA-baos are the duals of normal
neighborhood frames; ten Cate and Litak [2007] showed that AV-baos are the duals of
discrete general frames; and Holliday [2015] has given a dual representation of CV-baos
in the framework of possibility semantics. As for the question of whether incompleteness
persists if we retain only one of the properties C, A, or V: Litak [2004] showed that
there are C-incomplete logics, and Venema [2003] showed that there are A-incomplete
logics (by proving the much stronger result that there is a variety of baos all of whose
members are atomless). Finally, as for extending the Blok Dichotomy: Zakharyaschev
et al. [2001] noted that it extends to T -baos, Chagrova [1998] showed that it extends
to CA-baos, and Litak [2008] showed that it extends to all C-baos (indeed, even to
ω-complete baos, only requiring countable joins) as well as AV-baos.
One piece of the puzzle remained missing for over a decade: are there V-incomplete
logics (Litak 2004, Litak 2005b, Ch. 9, Litak 2008, § 7)? Venema [2007, § 6.1] also asked
whether there are V-inconsistent logics, i.e., normal modal logics that are not sound
over any V-bao. In this paper, we answer these questions affirmatively. Our solution
involves a first-order reformulation of the ostensibly second-order condition of complete
additivity, which arose in the context of possibility semantics mentioned above [Holliday,
2015].4 Using this first-order reformulation, we revisit an intriguing Kripke-incomplete
logic of van Benthem [1979] and show that van Benthem’s logic, previously known to be
4Around the same time that we proved that complete additivity of an operator in a bao is a ∀∃∀ first-
order condition, in January 2015, Hajnal Andre´ka, Zala´n Gyenis, and Istva´n Ne´meti independently
proved that complete additivity of an operator on a poset is preserved under ultraproducts. After
they learned of our result on the first-orderness of complete additivity in baos from Steven Givant,
Andre´ka et al. [2016] extended it from baos to arbitrary posets.
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AV- and T -incomplete, is the missing example of a V-incomplete logic. Furthermore,
it can be easily modified to answer Venema’s question on V-inconsistency. Building on
this example, we extend the Blok Dichotomy to V-incompleteness.
Given these results, the question arises of whether there are “naturally occurring” V-
incomplete logics. In the case of bimodal logic, we answer this question affirmatively. We
show that the bimodal provability logic GLB [Japaridze, 1988, Boolos, 1993], well-known
to be Kripke incomplete and hence CAV-incomplete, is also V-incomplete.
1.2 The Syntactic Angle
Van Benthem’s logic was designed to illuminate the second angle on Kripke incomplete-
ness mentioned above—the weakness of the notion of derivability in a normal modal logic
with axioms—so our story will bring these two angles together. Let Σ ⊢mnu ϕ mean that
ϕ belongs to the smallest normal modal logic that contains the formulas in Σ as axioms;
so thinking in terms of derivations, not only modus ponens but also necessitation and
uniform substitution may be applied to formulas from Σ. Van Benthem observed that
Kripke incompleteness results can be viewed as non-conservativity results with respect
to ⊢mnu. These results show that (i) for some modal formulas σ and ϕ, {σ} 0mnu ϕ, yet
(ii) every Kripke frame that validates σ also validates ϕ. As is well known, every modal
formula ϕ can be translated into a sentence SO(ϕ) of monadic second-order logic such
that ϕ is valid over a Kripke frame in the sense of Kripke semantics iff SO(ϕ) is true in
the frame as a standard second-order structure. Thus, (ii) can be rephrased as the fact
that every Kripke frame that makes SO(σ) true also makes SO(ϕ) true. Van Benthem
observed that the proof of (ii) typically shows that SO(ϕ) is derivable from SO(σ) using
some weak system of monadic second-order logic plus an axiom of choice. In this sense,
the second-order system is not conservative with respect to ⊢mnu, in light of (i). To bet-
ter gauge the weakness of ⊢mnu, van Benthem asked whether there exist such a ϕ and
σ for which the derivation of SO(ϕ) from SO(σ) can be carried out using only what he
considered the weakest reasonable second-order system, dubbed weak second-order logic.
This would be a striking example of the weakness of ⊢mnu compared to second-order
logic. Van Benthem indeed found such a ϕ and σ. We will call the smallest normal
modal logic containing that σ, which does not contain ϕ by (i), the logic vB.
We will show that vB is a V-incomplete logic by showing that every V-bao that
validates σ also validates ϕ. At the end of the paper, we will follow a path in the spirit
of van Benthem 1979: how can we strengthen our base logic to derive the formula ϕ
from σ, and what does this show about the weakness of the base logic? We begin by
reviewing van Benthem’s approach of translation into weak second-order logic. As it
turns out, even weak second-order logic is much more powerful than what one needs
to derive van Benthem’s ϕ from his σ and thereby demonstrate non-conservativity with
respect to basic modal logic. We consider two ways of extending the basic modal syntax
for this purpose. One way leads to the nominal5 calculus that characterizes consequence
over AV-baos. Another way leads to the tense calculus that characterizes consequence
5 The more recent use of the corresponding adjective in theoretical computer science [Pitts, 2013, 2016]
has nothing to do with the term as used in § 8.2 and references quoted therein.
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over T -baos. Finally, we find a common core for these weakenings: we show how
the first-order reformulation of complete additivity inspires additional modal inference
rules admissible over V-baos that allow us to derive van Benthem’s ϕ from his σ. Of
course, characterizing a consequence relation by means of a (set of) rule(s), in a possibly
extended syntax, is much more than just admissibility: in addition to soundness, one
requires a generic completeness result. We will leave as an open question whether the
rules we are proposing yield a syntactic characterization of V-consequence.
1.3 Organization
The paper is organized as follows. In § 2, we review the proof that van Benthem’s logic
vB is Kripke incomplete, which we find to be a simple, vivid, and hence pedagogically
useful example of Kripke incompleteness. In § 3, we review the algebraic approach to
modal (in)completeness as in Litak 2005b. With this background, we proceed to the
main part of the paper: in § 4, we present the first-order reformulation of complete
additivity, and in § 5, we use this reformulation to prove that the unimodal logic vB
and the bimodal logic GLB are V-incomplete as above (and that the quasi-normal logic
GLSB is even V-inconsistent in a suitably adjusted sense). In § 6, we discuss issues
of decidability and complexity: we show that even V-inconsistent logics do not have
to be more complex than the classical propositional calculus, that the property of V-
completeness is in general undecidable, but that the associated notion of consequence
(unlike Kripke frame consequence) is recursively axiomatizable. In § 7, we build on the
example of vB to generalize the Blok Dichotomy to V-incompleteness. In the remaining
sections we discuss the second, syntactic angle presented above: in § 8, we give syntactic
proofs in existing derivation systems of the formula witnessing the incompleteness of vB;
and in § 9, we discuss extending our base logic with new V-sound rules of inference. We
conclude the paper in § 10 with open problems for future research.
2 Kripke Incompleteness
In order to put Kripke incompleteness in context, let us review some basic definitions.
Let L be the set of formulas of propositional modal logic generated from a set {pn}n∈N
of propositional variables. We use the usual notation for connectives: →, ∧, ∨, ⊥, ,
♦. A normal modal logic is a set L ⊆ L such that: (a) L contains all tautologies of
classical propositional logic; (b) L is closed under modus ponens, i.e., if ϕ ∈ L and
ϕ → ψ ∈ L, then ψ ∈ L; (c) L is closed under uniform substitution, i.e., if ϕ ∈ L
and ψ is the result of uniformly substituting formulas for propositional variables in ϕ,
then ψ ∈ L; (d) L is closed under necessitation, i.e., if ϕ ∈ L, then ϕ ∈ L; and (e)
(p0 → p1)→ (p0 → p1) ∈ L. Let K be the smallest normal modal logic.
The definition of a normal modal logic extends to polymodal languages with multiple
modalities 1, 2, etc., by requiring (d) and (e) for each i. In this section, we focus
on the unimodal language, but polymodal languages will become important in § 5.
We assume familiarity with Kripke frames F = 〈W,R〉, Kripke modelsM = 〈W,R, V 〉,
and the Kripke semantic definition of when a formula is true at a w ∈ W : M, w  ϕ.
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We abuse notation and write ‘w ∈ F ’ or ‘w ∈ M’ to mean w ∈ W . For convenient
additional notation, given w ∈ W , let R(w) = {v ∈ W | wRv}, and given ϕ ∈ L, let
JϕKM = V (ϕ) = {v ∈ W | M, v  ϕ}. A formula ϕ is globally true in a Kripke model
M, written ‘M  ϕ’, iff M, w  ϕ for every w ∈ M; and ϕ is valid over a Kripke frame
F = 〈W,R〉, written ‘F  ϕ’, iffM  ϕ for every modelM = 〈W,R, V 〉 based on F . A
formula is valid over a class F of Kripke frames iff it is valid over every frame in the class.
Let Log(F) be the set of formulas valid over F, which is always a normal modal logic.
A logic L is Kripke complete if there is a class F of Kripke frames for which L = Log(F).
Otherwise it is Kripke incomplete. For any logic L, we can consider the class of frames
that validate it: Fr(L) = {F | F  ϕ for all ϕ ∈ L}. For a Kripke complete logic,
L = Log(Fr(L)), whereas for a Kripke incomplete logic, L ( Log(Fr(L)).
Everything said above was in terms of validity, but we could also put our discussion
in terms of consequence. To avoid confusion, it is important to distinguish between the
following consequence relations, following van Benthem [1983, p. 37]:
• Σ M,l ϕ iff for every Kripke model M and w ∈ M, if M, w  σ for all σ ∈ Σ,
then M, w  ϕ (local consequence over models).
• Σ F ϕ iff for every Kripke frame F , if F  σ for all σ ∈ Σ, then F  ϕ (global
consequence over frames).
These two notions of consequence are related to two different notions of when ϕ is
derivable from a set Σ of formulas. Let Σ ⊢m
K
ϕ iff ϕ belongs to the closure of K ∪ Σ
under modus ponens. Let Σ ⊢mnu
K
ϕ iff ϕ belongs to the smallest normal modal logic
L ⊇ Σ, which is the closure of K ∪ Σ under modus ponens, necessitation, and uniform
substitution. Our ⊢mnu
K
is what van Benthem [1979] denotes by ‘⊢K ’ and calls ‘the
minimal modal logic K’. It would be reasonable to call ⊢mnu
K
derivability from axioms
and to call ⊢m
K
derivability from premises, since intuitively necessitation and uniform
substitution should be applicable to logical axioms but not to arbitrary premises.
The relation M,l is axiomatized by ⊢
m
K
: Σ M,l ϕ iff Σ ⊢
m
K
ϕ, which is equivalent to
there being σ1, . . . , σn ∈ Σ such that (σ1 ∧ · · · ∧σn)→ ϕ ∈ K. By contrast, by the result
of Thomason [1975a] mentioned in § 1, F is not recursively axiomatizable. We have
that Σ ⊢mnu
K
ϕ implies Σ F ϕ, but the converse is not guaranteed. The “weakness” of
⊢mnu referred to in § 1.2 is the fact that Σ F ϕ does not guarantee Σ ⊢
mnu
K
ϕ.
While M,l seems to capture an intuitive notion of modal consequence, the relation
F implicitly prefixes all premises by arbitrary sequences of boxes and universal quan-
tifiers over propositional variables, so it yields striking consequences like {p} F ⊥ and
{ϕ} F ϕ. Thus, it does not enjoy a deduction theorem and one should not think
about sets of formulas closed under F as “local theories”. There is, however, a better
way to think about F . In modal logic, we are often not interested in the class of all
frames, but rather in some restricted classes of frames, perhaps defined as Fr(Σ) for
some set Σ ⊆ L. We then want to know what formulas are valid over this class, i.e.,
whether ϕ ∈ Log(Fr(Σ)). This is equivalent to asking whether Σ F ϕ. Also note that
L is Kripke complete as above iff for every ϕ ∈ L, L F ϕ implies ϕ ∈ L.
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Let vB be the smallest normal modal logic containing the axiom
♦⊤ → ((p→ p)→ p),
which we will call the vB-axiom. Van Benthem [1979] proved that the logic vB is
Kripke incomplete. While vB may at first seem an entirely ad hoc example of a Kripke-
incomplete logic, we will observe a striking connection between the incompleteness of vB
and the incompleteness of an important provability logic in § 5.2. In this connection, it
is noteworthy that the vB-axiom is a theorem of the provability logic GL, the smallest
normal modal logic containing the Lo¨b axiom, (p → p)→ p. Substituting ⊥ for p
in the Lo¨b axiom yields ♦⊤ → ⊥, which in the context of provability logic is a modal
version of Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem.6 Clearly the vB-axiom is derivable
from ♦⊤ → ⊥. In the other direction, van Benthem showed that ♦⊤ → ⊥ is a
Kripke-frame consequence of the vB-axiom. However, he also showed that ♦⊤ → ⊥
is not a theorem of vB. Together these facts imply the Kripke-incompleteness of vB.
So that our presentation is somewhat self-contained, we will include van Benthem’s
proof of the Kripke-incompleteness of vB. It should be emphasized that this is one of
the simplest proofs of Kripke incompleteness.7 It should also be emphasized that in § 5
we will prove a much more general result than the following lemma; but we include a
proof of Lemma 2.1 for later reference in § 8.
Lemma 2.1. Any Kripke frame that validates vB also validates ♦⊤ → ⊥.
Proof. Let F be a Kripke frame that validates vB. We need to show that if x ∈ F
is such that R(x) 6= ∅, then there is a w ∈ R(x) such that R(w) = ∅ (think of the
contrapositive: ♦⊤ → ♦⊥). Thus, consider an x ∈ F such that R(x) 6= ∅ and a
y ∈ R(x). Let M be a model based on F with JpKM = {u ∈ F | u 6= y}. For
reductio, suppose there is no w ∈ R(x) with R(w) = ∅, so M, x  ♦⊤. Then since
F validates vB, we have M, x  ((p → p) → p), which with y ∈ R(x) implies
6When describing the origin of the vB axiom, van Benthem [1979] hints at a quasi-normal logic that
one recognizes as (a subsystem of) Solovay’s system GLS (see, e.g., Boolos 1993, p. 65), another
central formalism in the area of provability logic. The formula under  in the consequent of vB,
i.e., (p → p) → p, is a theorem of GLS, and as shown by a syntactic derivation in van Benthem
1979, this formula alone makes it impossible to characterize GLS in terms of Kripke semantics with
distinguished worlds, which is the standard relational semantics for quasi-normal systems. We will
discuss such provability-related quasi-normal systems in § 5.3.
7It is not, however, the most natural example of a Kripke incomplete unimodal logic. That honor
goes to the logic of the Henkin sentence (p ↔ p) → p (see Boolos and Sambin 1985), which is
also a simplest possible Kripke incomplete unimodal logic in the following sense: it is axiomatized
by a formula with only one propositional variable and modal depth 2. Lewis [1974] showed that all
normal unimodal logics axiomatizable by formulas of modal depth ≤ 1 are Kripke complete. Despite
its charms, the Henkin logic is irrelevant for our purposes in this paper, for a reason that can be
explained using notions introduced in § 3: the proof of its Kripke incompleteness does not attack
complete additivity, but rather closure under countable joins/meets, i.e., ωC-completeness. This
property is exploited by most incompleteness proofs involving GL and its relatives, like the failure
of strong completeness of GL itself or the Kripke-inconsistency of various tense logics containing GL
(although counterexamples related to the original one by Thomason 1972 clash with full C rather
than its restriction to κC for any fixed cardinality κ) [Litak, 2005b].
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M, y  (p → p) → p, which with our valuation for p implies M, y 2 (p → p).
Thus, there is a z ∈ R(y) such that M, z  p but M, z 2 p. From M, z 2 p, we have
z = y. Then from z ∈ R(y) and M, z  p, we have y ∈ R(y) and M, y  p, so
M, y  p, a contradiction. Hence there is a w ∈ R(x) with R(w) = ∅, as desired. ⊣
All that remains to show is that ♦⊤ → ⊥ 6∈ vB. We can do so by exhibiting a
Kripke modelM and showing that every ϕ ∈ vB is globally true inM, while ♦⊤ → ⊥
is not. Since every ϕ ∈ K is globally true in every Kripke model, and the set of formulas
that are globally true in a given Kripke model M is closed under modus ponens and
necessitation, to show that every ϕ ∈ vB is globally true in M, it suffices to show that
every substitution instance of the vB-axiom is globally true in M (in the terminology of
Fine 1974, the vB-axiom is strongly verified in M).
In the literature on Kripke incompleteness, rather than directly exhibiting a modelM
as above, authors typically exhibit an appropriate general frame8 G = 〈W,R,W〉 where
〈W,R〉 is a Kripke frame and W is a family of subsets of W that is closed under union,
complement relative to W , and the operation X 7→ R−1[X] = {w ∈W | ∃x ∈ X : wRx}.
An admissible model based on a general frame G = 〈W,R,W〉 is a modelM = 〈W,R, V 〉
such that JpKM ∈ W for every propositional variable p. An easy induction then shows
that for every ϕ ∈ L, JϕKM ∈W. It follows that if a formula ψ is globally true in every
admissible model based on G—in which case ψ is valid over G , written ‘G  ψ’—then
for any particular admissible model M based on G , all substitution instances of ψ are
globally true inM. Thus, to obtain a modelM as in the previous paragraph, it suffices
to exhibit a general frame G over which the vB-axiom is valid, while ♦⊤ → ⊥ is not.
Another way to motivate going to a general frame here is by the following observation.
Define a consequence relation G by Γ G ϕ iff for every general frame G , if G  σ for all
σ ∈ Σ, then G  ϕ. Then it can be shown that there is an exact match between G and
the derivability relation ⊢mnu
K
above: Σ G ϕ iff ϕ belongs to the smallest normal modal
logic containing Σ. So to show that ♦⊤ → ⊥ does not belong to vB, we simply show
that {vB-axiom} 2G ♦⊤ → ⊥, which is again to show that there is a general frame
G over which the vB-axiom is valid, while ♦⊤ → ⊥ is not.
Definition 2.2 (van Benthem frame). The van Benthem frame (see Figure 1) is the
general frame V B = 〈W,R,W〉 where:
1. W = N ∪ {∞,∞+ 1};
2. R = {〈∞+ 1,∞〉, 〈∞,∞〉} ∪ {〈∞, n〉 | n ∈ N} ∪ {〈m,n〉 | m,n ∈ N,m > n};9
3. W = {X ⊆W | X is finite and ∞ 6∈ X} ∪ {X ⊆W | X is cofinite and ∞ ∈ X}.
Observe that W is closed under union, relative complement, and X 7→ R−1[X].
We now add the final piece of the argument.
8Readers familiar with the algebraic approach to modal logic will of course note that one can directly
define a modal algebra (bao) instead. We will introduce modal algebras soon in § 3.
9Cresswell [1984] notes that we can leave out 〈∞,∞〉, but the ∞-reflexive variant will be more conve-
nient in § 6.1.
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∞+ 1 ∞ . . . 2 1 0
Figure 1: The van Benthem frame VB.
Lemma 2.3. ♦⊤ → ((p → p) → p) is valid over VB, while ♦⊤ → ⊥ is not.
Thus, ♦⊤ → ⊥ 6∈ vB.
Proof. Consider any admissible modelM based on VB. First observe that 0 ∈ J⊥KM,
and for all w ∈W \ {∞+1}, wR0, so w 6∈ J♦⊤KM; but ∞+1 ∈ J♦⊤KM, so we have
J♦⊤KM = {∞ + 1}. Thus, we need only show that ∞+ 1 ∈ J((p → p) → p)KM,
which is equivalent to ∞ ∈ J(p → p) → pKM. If ∞ ∈ J(p → p)KM, then for
every n ∈ N, n ∈ Jp → pKM, whence an obvious induction shows that N ⊆ JpKM.
Hence JpKM is cofinite, so ∞ ∈ JpKM. This shows that ∞ ∈ J(p→ p)→ pKM, which
completes the proof that ♦⊤ → ((p→ p)→ p) is valid over VB.
Finally, observe that ∞+ 1 6∈ J♦⊤→ ⊥KM. ⊣
Putting together Lemmas 2.1 and 2.3, we have the claimed result.
Theorem 2.4 (van Benthem 1979). The logic vB is Kripke incomplete.
Van Benthem’s main point was not that vB is Kripke incomplete10 but that it is a
special example of such incompleteness: it can be used to show that the derivability
relation ⊢mnu
K
falls short of capturing not only the consequence relation F itself, but
also syntactically inspired weakenings of F . We will return to this in § 8.
The main point we wish to make about vB is that it is special in another way: it
provides the long missing example of a V-incomplete logic. To explain what this means
and its context, let us now review the algebraic perspective on modal logic.
3 The Algebraic Approach to Modal (In)completeness
As noted in § 1, the discovery of Kripke incompleteness renewed interest in the algebraic
semantics for normal modal logics based on Boolean algebras with operators (baos)
[Jo´nsson and Tarski, 1951, 1952]. An n-ary operator on a Boolean algebra with universe
10Indeed, the very existence of Kripke incomplete logics was not much of a revelation anymore at the
time. We have already mentioned in the opening paragraph of this paper that Kripke incompleteness
was first demonstrated with a bimodal logic [Thomason, 1972] and shortly thereafter with complicated
unimodal logics [Fine, 1974, Thomason, 1974a] located in increasingly specific areas of the lattice
of extensions of K. Van Benthem himself devoted an earlier paper [1978] to simple examples of
incomplete logics. Moreover, at that time two crucial results (which are going to be our main concern
in § 6.3 and §§ 7-8) that make explicit the ubiquity and unavoidability of Kripke incompleteness were
already known: Thomason 1975a and Blok 1978.
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A is a function f : An → A that preserves finite joins in each coordinate (including
the join of the empty set, ⊥); a dual operator preserves finite meets in each coordinate
(including the meet of the empty set, ⊤). A bao is a Boolean algebra equipped with a
collection of operators. In this paper, we consider only baos with unary operators. If
the collection of these operators in a bao A has cardinality κ, we call A a κ-bao. Per
tradition, we call a 1-bao a modal algebra (ma).
The language of basic unimodal logic can be interpreted in an ma A in the obvious
way: any mapping θ of propositional variables to elements of A extends to a mapping θˆ
of arbitrary formulas to elements of A, taking θˆ(p) = θ(p), θˆ(¬ϕ) = −θˆ(ϕ), θˆ(ϕ ∨ ψ) =
θˆ(ϕ) + θˆ(ψ), and θˆ(♦ϕ) = f(θˆ(ϕ)), where −, +, and f are the complement, join, and
operator in A, respectively. The ma A validates a modal formula ϕ (notation: A  ϕ)
iff every such mapping sends ϕ to the top element ⊤ of A. For a given class X of mas
(see below for important examples of such classes), we define a consequence relation X ,
analogous to the global Kripke frame consequence relation F from § 2:
• Σ X ϕ iff for every A ∈ X , if A  σ for all σ ∈ Σ, then A  ϕ.
All of the notions above extend to interpreting a polymodal language with κ modal
operators in κ-baos in the obvious way.
Definition 3.1. Let X be a class of κ-baos and L a normal modal logic in a language
with κ modal operators. We say that L is X -complete if for all formulas ϕ, we have
ϕ ∈ L iff L X ϕ. Otherwise L is X -incomplete.
Equivalently, L is X -complete if L is the logic of some class K ⊆ X , i.e., L is exactly
the set of formulas validated by all baos in K.
Each normal modal logic L is the logic of a bao: the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra
of L, whose elements are the equivalence classes of modal formulas under the relation
defined by ϕ ∼ ψ iff ϕ ↔ ψ ∈ L, and whose operations are defined in the obvious way:
−[ϕ] = [¬ϕ], [ϕ]+[ψ] = [ϕ∨ψ], and fi([ϕ]) = [♦iϕ]. This general algebraic completeness
theorem via Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras can be seen as a special case of an even more
general approach: since the derivability relation11 ⊢mn
L
associated with a given normal
modal logic L is (Rasiowa) implicative and hence strongly finitely algebraizable, one
obtains a strong completeness theorem for L with respect to algebraic semantics using the
standard machinery of abstract algebraic logic (AAL) [Rasiowa, 1974, Blok and Pigozzi,
1989, Czelakowski, 2001, Andre´ka et al., 2001, Font, 2006, Font et al., 2003, 2009]; see
§ 5.3 and especially Footnote 16 for historical origins of this approach.
Before proceeding further, let us fix notation for dealing with algebras. We use gothic
letters A,B,C . . . for names of algebras and a, b, c . . . for elements of algebras. Whenever
it is not confusing, we blur the distinction between an algebra and its carrier, writing
statements like ‘a ∈ A’. We also blur the distinction between modal formulas and bao-
terms, and henceforth we will simply use ¬, ∨, and ∧ for the complement, join, and
11The relation ⊢mnL is defined by: Σ ⊢
mn
L ϕ iff ϕ belongs to the closure of L ∪ Σ under modus ponens
and necessitation. For L = K, ⊢mnK is the derivability relation that matches global consequence over
Kripke models: Σ M ϕ iff for every Kripke model M, if M  σ for all σ ∈ Σ, then M  ϕ.
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meet, respectively, in our algebras, trusting that no confusion will arise. In an ma, we
take ♦ to be the operator and  to be a dual operator, defined by a = ¬♦¬a. In baos,
we may add indices to distinguish between multiple operators, e.g., taking 〈0〉 and 〈1〉
to be operators and [0] and [1] to be their duals.
The generic completeness result described above made the algebraic semantics histor-
ically the first to be studied, prior to the invention of Kripke frames (see Goldblatt 2003,
§ 3; Blackburn et al. 2001, § 1.7). However, one can also obtain a generic completeness
result with respect to the general frames of § 2. This result is implicit already in the work
of Jo´nsson and Tarski [1951, 1952], who proposed an extension of Stone’s Representation
Theorem from Boolean algebras to baos. The general frames obtained via this repre-
sentation are known as descriptive frames; thus, every normal modal logic is sound and
complete with respect to a class of descriptive frames. Furthermore, for a large class of
modal axioms/equations, especially so-called Sahlqvist axioms and their various gener-
alizations (see, e.g., Conradie et al. 2006 or Conradie et al. 2014 and references therein),
one can in addition observe their persistence in passing from a descriptive frame to its
underlying Kripke frame. This phenomenon is known in the contemporary literature as
canonicity or d-persistence (Chagrov and Zakharyaschev 1997, Ch. 10, Blackburn et al.
2001, Ch. 5), but in hindsight the Jo´nsson-Tarski work can be seen as its earliest study.
In short, algebra combined with duality theory provides a viable route towards Kripke
completeness results for suitably well-behaved logics. On the other hand, as far as weak
completeness (which is the main subject of the present paper) with respect to finite
models is concerned, it is not necessary to phrase such completeness results in alge-
braic terms or to involve the Stone-Jo´nsson-Tarski duality in the proof. Think, e.g., of
tableaux-style extraction of countermodels from failed proof search in suitable Gentzen-
style calculi (in fact, close to Kripke’s original work) or the technique of normal forms.
Such finitary approaches are not restricted to d-persistent logics. See Fine 1975, Moss
2007, and Bezhanishvili and Ghilardi 2014; the relationship with duality theory and
construction of free algebras is discussed in Ghilardi 1995, Bezhanishvili and Kurz 2007,
and Coumans and van Gool 2013.
Remark 3.2. Henkin-style general-frame strong completeness of logics in countably
many variables is equivalent to the weak Ko¨nig Lemma even over RCA0, the weak base
theory for reverse mathematics [Simpson, 2009, IV.3.3]. Recall that the weak Ko¨nig
Lemma holds in ZF or even in the Zermelo set theory (i.e., ZF without replacement).
On the other hand, for uncountably many propositional variables, one needs representa-
tion theorems in the style of Jo´nsson and Tarski. They rely on the Ultrafilter Theorem,
or equivalently, the Boolean Prime Ideal Theorem (BPI). It would thus seem that com-
pleteness based on canonicity is rather non-constructive, but with some care it is possible
to prove more fine-grained results along these lines—see Ghilardi and Meloni 1997 and
Suzuki 2010 or strong completeness with respect to the general possibility frames of
Holliday 2015. It is also worth mentioning that strong Kripke completeness does not
imply d-persistence, as in the case of the tense logic of the reals [Wolter, 1996b]; if one
is willing to extend the notions of strong completeness and canonicity to neighborhood
frames, another counterexample is provided by the McKinsey logic [Surendonk, 2001].
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In the reverse direction, we of course do not need Kripke frames (or any other seman-
tics) as an intermediate step in proving algebraic completeness; the Lindenbaum-Tarski
construction provides a direct route. Nevertheless, Kripke completeness results can be
reformulated and understood from an algebraic point of view: they establish that the
equational class (variety) of baos corresponding to a given modal logic is determined
by its elements with special additional properties. In other words, they show that when
looking for algebraic models refuting a given formula/equation, one can restrict attention
to a well-behaved subclass of algebras.
Let us discuss this in more detail. Recall the standard construction associating with
a given Kripke frame F = 〈W,R〉 its dual ma F+, whose universe is ℘(W ), whose
Boolean operations are interpreted using the set-theoretic ones, and whose operator is
defined by ♦X = R−1[X]. This is just a special case of taking the dual of a general
frame G = 〈W,R,W〉, where the ma in question is provided by W; in the case of Kripke
frames, W = ℘(W ). As observed already by Jo´nsson and Tarski [1951, 1952], such an
ma always has the following three special (and mutually independent) properties.
(C) lattice-completeness: given any set X of elements of A, its join
∨
X exists in A.
This also implies the existence of arbitrary meets.
(A) atomicity : any non-bottom element is above an atom, i.e., a minimal non-bottom
element.
(V) complete additivity : for any set X of elements, if
∨
X exists, then
∨
{♦x | x ∈ X}
exists and
♦
∨
X =
∨
{♦x | x ∈ X}.
For complete mas, complete additivity reduces to distributivity of ♦ over arbitrary joins.
Of course, V can be equivalently stated with
∧
replacing
∨
and  replacing ♦.
Remark 3.3. In the case of (duals of) Kripke frames, where every subset is admissible,∨
is simply
⋃
. Nevertheless—and this is an important point!—it does not have to be the
case with general frames whose W is lattice-complete. In particular, in any descriptive
frame associated with an infinite C-bao, there are instances of joins and meets not
coinciding with unions and intersections. The atoms of (duals of) Kripke frames are
obviously singleton sets {x}. Again, for arbitrary general frames this does not have to
be the case, but this is less crucial: in differentiated general frames, which are in an
important sense the only relevant ones, admissible atoms have to be singleton sets.
Remark 3.4. As we shift from unimodal to polymodal contexts, C will be the class of
complete baos with the appropriate number of operators in the context, and similarly
for A, V, etc. In principle, when we say a polymodal logic is V-complete, we should mean
that it is complete with respect to baos in which every operator is completely additive.
But most of the time, complete additivity of all operators occurring is not needed, and
we may wish to be more fine-grained: given a logic L with modalities indexed by natural
numbers, we can say that L is Vn-complete if it is X -complete, as in Definition 3.1, where
X is the class of baos in which the n-th operator is completely additive.
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As it turns out, the combination of the three properties above is a defining feature
of duals of Kripke frames. One can say even more: the category of Kripke frames with
bounded morphisms is dually equivalent to that of CAV-baos with complete morphisms
[Thomason, 1975b]. In particular, taking any Kripke frame/CAV-bao, converting it into
its dual CAV-bao/Kripke frame, and then going back produces an output isomorphic
to the original input. Therefore, Kripke completeness is just CAV-completeness.
In this way, we are led to the first of the two angles on Kripke incompleteness discussed
in the introduction: the semantic angle. Given that the properties C, A, and V are
independent of each other, will arbitrary combinations of these three lead to distinct
notions of completeness, each more general than Kripke completeness but less general
than algebraic completeness? Or is the propositional modal language too coarse to
care about differences between all or at least some of these semantics? And how about
other notions contained somewhere in between? For example, C can be weakened to
ω-completeness (ωC), i.e., closure under countable meets and joins. One can then ask
if there are logics that are ωC-complete but not C-complete. For another important
example, consider the property T of admissibility of residuals/conjugates. Recall that A
admits conjugates if there is a function p : A 7→ A such that for every a, b ∈ A, a∧♦b = ⊥
iff pa ∧ b = ⊥. Alternatively, we can say that an algebra admits residuals if there is
a function h : A 7→ A such that for every a, b ∈ A, a ≤ hb iff ♦a ≤ b. These two
definitions are equivalent, taking ha = ¬p¬a.12 Some well-known facts include T ⊆ V
(i.e., admissibility of residuals implies complete additivity) and CT = CV (i.e., in the
presence of lattice-completeness, the converse implication also holds). Once again, one
may ask: how does T -completeness relate to all the other completeness notions?
As mentioned in § 1, a systematic investigation into these questions has been un-
dertaken by Litak [2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2008], unifying, expanding, and building on
earlier results by Thomason, Fine, Gerson, van Benthem, Chagrova, Chagrov, Wolter,
Zakharyaschev, Venema, and other researchers. There is no place here to discuss most
of the results in detail, but an executive summary of those most relevant for the present
paper is as follows:
• almost any conceivable combination of the above properties of baos leads to a
distinct notion of completeness. In other words, for almost any pair of such com-
binations, there is a logic complete in one sense, but not in the other;
• the Blok Dichotomy (§ 7), the result of Wim Blok showing that Kripke incomplete-
ness is in a certain mathematical sense the norm rather than an exception among
normal modal logics, generalizes to most of these weaker notions of completeness;
• many of these notions admit syntactic characterizations in terms of conservativity
of certain types of extensions, e.g., AV-completeness in terms of conservativity of
minimal nominal extensions (§ 8.2), T -completeness in terms of conservativity of
minimal tense extension (§ 8.3), or ωC-completeness in terms of conservativity of
minimal infinitary extensions with countable conjunctions and disjunctions.
12Observe that we do not require that residuals are term-definable. This is the difference between baos
admitting residuals and Jipsen’s [1993] residuated baos.
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The possibility of V-incompleteness, however, was left completely open, and in fact it
was the sole reason for the “almost any” hedge above (Litak 2004, Litak 2005b, Ch. 9,
Litak 2008, § 7). Discussing this line of research in the Handbook of Modal Logic, Venema
[2007, § 6.1] singled out a slightly stronger version of the same question: whether there
are V-inconsistent logics, i.e., normal modal logics that are not sound over any V-bao.
Why was this question so puzzling? First of all, note that while a free algebra on
infinitely many generators in any variety of baos can never be lattice-complete or atomic,
it can be completely additive.13 One can imagine that if V is not inconsistent with
freeness, then there might be a general way of turning any bao into a completely additive
one without changing the set of valid equations. But there are other ways in which
complete additivity seemed somewhat intangible. Unlike its closest relatives AV and
T , for which van Benthem’s logic vB can be shown to be incomplete, V did not seem
definable in a language with a usable model theory.
Let us make this more precise. There is an obvious first-order correspondence language
for baos, whose connectives can be written as ∀,∃, ⇒ , & , OR , NOT (to avoid nota-
tional clashes with bao-terms and modal formulas). For classes of algebras definable in
this language, one can even blur the distinction between the class itself and its defining
formula. A, AV, and T are first-order properties, in fact even ∀∃∀-properties. But how
could one define V without using infinitary formulas (of unrestricted cardinality!) or a
powerful second-order language (with full rather than Henkin semantics)?
4 V as an Elementary Class
Surprisingly, complete additivity is in fact a first-order property. To prove this, it will
be helpful to use some abbreviations for describing relations between elements of a bao
A. Let lower-case letters range over elements of A and define:
a  b stands for a 6= ⊥ & a ≤ b
∃a  b α stands for ∃a (a  b & α)
∀a  b α stands for ∀a (a  b ⇒ α).
Consider a property of baos formulated in our correspondence language as follows:
R : ∀a, b
(
(a ∧ ♦b 6= ⊥) ⇒ ∃c  b∀d  c (a ∧ ♦d 6= ⊥)
)
.
The origin of this condition is in the duality theory for classes of baos and possibility
frames in Holliday 2015. There the condition is viewed as follows. Given a bao A, define
a binary relation R♦ on the universe of A by: aR♦c iff for all d  c, we have a∧♦d 6= ⊥.
Then A satisfies R iff whenever a ∧ ♦b 6= ⊥, there is a c  b such that aR♦c. Any such
13For a characterization of when the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of a normal modal logic is completely
additive, see Holliday 2015, § 7.2. Ghilardi [1995] showed that free algebras in the variety of all baos
are T -baos (and hence V-baos), while Bezhanishvili and Kurz [2007] extended this to all varieties of
baos axiomatized by rank-1 formulas. Holliday [2014] added an analogous result for KT, K4, KD4,
and S4 (and reproved it for K, KD, and all extensions of KB).
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bao can be turned into a possibility frame with the accessibility relation provided by
R♦ and the validity relation coinciding with that of the original algebra.
Remark 4.1. One may find a contrapositive formulation of R intuitive:
∀a, b ((∀c  b∃d  c ♦d ≤ a)⇒ ♦b ≤ a)
(cf. Lemma 9.1 for a  reformulation).
We will now prove that R is equivalent to complete additivity.
Theorem 4.2. R implies V.
Proof. We prove this by contraposition. Assume A is not a V-bao. This means there is
a B ⊆ A such that
∨
B exists in A, but there is an a ∈ A such that:
(i) for all b ∈ B, ♦b ≤ a
(ii) ♦
∨
B 6≤ a.
By (ii), ¬a ∧ ♦
∨
B 6= ⊥, so in order to refute R, it is enough to show that
∀c 
∨
B ∃d  c (¬a ∧ ♦d = ⊥).
Pick a c 
∨
B, so c ∧
∨
B 6= ⊥. By the join-infinite distributive law
c ∧
∨
B =
∨
{c ∧ b | b ∈ B}
holding in any Boolean algebra, it follows that there is a b ∈ B such that d := b ∧ c is
not ⊥, so d  c. But then
♦d = ♦(b ∧ c) ≤ ♦b ≤ a
by (i), so ¬a ∧ ♦d = ⊥. ⊣
Theorem 4.3. V implies R.
Proof. Again we reason by contraposition. Assume for some a, b ∈ A that
(a ∧ ♦b 6= ⊥)& ∀c  b∃d  c (a ∧ ♦d = ⊥). (1)
Consider B := {d  b | a ∧ ♦d = ⊥}. To refute V it is enough to show that∨
B = b,
for then a ∧ ♦
∨
B = a ∧ ♦b 6= ⊥, yet for all d ∈ B, a ∧ ♦d = ⊥, which implies
♦
∨
B 6=
∨
{♦d | d ∈ B}.
By definition of B, b is an upper bound of B, so we need only show that it is the least.
Suppose there is an upper bound b′ of B such that b 6≤ b′. Hence c := b ∧ ¬b′ is not ⊥,
so c  b. Then (1) implies there is a d  c such that d ∈ B. Therefore d ≤ ¬b′, and
since b′ is an upper bound of B, d ≤ b′. But then d = ⊥, contradicting d  c. ⊣
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Remark 4.4. T implies R in a more direct way: where p is the conjugate of ♦, take
c := pa ∧ b, so a ∧ ♦b 6= ⊥ implies pa ∧ b 6= ⊥ and hence c  b; then if d  c were such
that a ∧ ♦d = ⊥, we would have pa ∧ d = ⊥ and hence d ≤ pa ≤ −d, contradicting
d  c. We shall see a derivation of a similar form at the end of § 9.2.
Corollary 4.5. V = R.
Not only does this show that V is a first-order property but furthermore that it is of
a rather convenient syntactic shape: ∀∃∀. Such conditions are particularly convenient
for reformulation as non-standard inference rules, which we will discuss in § 9.
Remark 4.6. In response to our proof that V is equivalent to the first-order property
R, Johan van Benthem (p. c.) devised a proof of the first-orderness of V in the style of
correspondence theory [van Benthem, 2001]. First note that in the equality for V,
♦
∨
X =
∨
{♦x | x ∈ X},
the ≥ direction is immediate from the monotonicity of ♦. Thus, using the equivalence
of ♦
∨
X ≤
∨
{♦x | x ∈ X} and ∀z
(∨
{♦x | x ∈ X} ≤ z ⇒ ♦
∨
X ≤ z
)
, we can rewrite
V as the following sentence in the second-order language of baos:
∀y ∀z ∀X
((
y =
∨
X & ∀x (x ∈ X ⇒ ♦x ≤ z)
)
⇒ ♦y ≤ z
)
, (2)
where ‘y =
∨
X’ abbreviates the first-order sentence expressing that y is the least upper
bound of X. Since X does not occur in the consequent of the outer conditional in (2),
we can rewrite (2) as
∀y ∀z
(
∃X
(
y =
∨
X & ∀x (x ∈ X ⇒ ♦x ≤ z)
)
⇒ ♦y ≤ z
)
. (3)
Now we observe that the antecedent of the outer conditional in (3) is equivalent to a
first-order sentence. For there exists an X as in the antecedent iff y is the least upper
bound of the following first-order definable set:
Xy,z := {x ∈ A | x ≤ y & ♦x ≤ z}.
One direction of the ‘iff’ is immediate. For the other, if a set X is such that y =
∨
X
and ∀x (x ∈ X ⇒ ♦x ≤ z), then X ⊆ Xy,z and hence
∨
X ≤
∨
Xy,z. Then since
y =
∨
X and
∨
Xy,z ≤ y, we have y =
∨
Xy,z, and by definition of Xy,z, we have
∀x (x ∈ Xy,z ⇒ ♦x ≤ z). Thus, if there is any witness for the ∃X, then Xy,z is a
witness. Hence (3) can be equivalently rewritten as the following first-order sentence:
∀y ∀z (y =
∨
Xy,z ⇒ ♦y ≤ z), (4)
where ‘y =
∨
Xy,z’ abbreviates the first-order sentence expressing that y is the least up-
per bound of Xy,z. This completes the proof that V is first-order. Further manipulations
are required to show that (4) is equivalent to R in particular.
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5 V-Incompleteness
Using the equivalence of V and R, we can now prove a result from which all of our
V-incompleteness theorems will derive.
Theorem 5.1. Let A be a bao, a ∈ A, and 〈0〉 and 〈1〉 operators on A (not necessarily
in the signature) such that
1. 〈1〉 is completely additive, and
2. for any x ∈ A, a ≤ [1]([0]([0]x → x)→ x).
Then a ≤ [1]⊥.
Proof. Suppose that a∧ 〈1〉⊤ 6= ⊥. Since 〈1〉 is completely additive, by Theorem 4.3 we
can apply condition R to 〈1〉 with b := ⊤ to obtain:
∃c 6= ⊥∀d  c (a ∧ 〈1〉d 6= ⊥). (5)
Pick such a c and observe that if c ≤ 〈0〉(c ∧ [0]¬c), then (using this very inequality to
substitute 〈0〉(c ∧ [0]¬c) for the first occurrence of c on the right-hand side) we get
c ≤ 〈0〉(c ∧ [0]¬c) ≤ 〈0〉(〈0〉(c ∧ [0]¬c) ∧ [0]¬c) = ⊥,
a contradiction. Hence we have that
c ∧ [0]([0]¬c→ ¬c) 6= ⊥.
Then by taking d in (5) to be c ∧ [0]([0]¬c → ¬c), we have
a ∧ 〈1〉(c ∧ [0]([0]¬c→ ¬c)) 6= ⊥,
which contradicts condition 2 in the statement of the theorem. ⊣
The fact that we do not insist on these operators to be primitive allows a lot of
flexibility in instantiating this theorem, as we will witness below in Theorems 5.2, 5.4,
5.6, 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5. Note that working with this more general notion of operator would
in fact allow us to replace a with ⊤ in the above statement without loss of generality:
the present statement would follow after replacing [1]x with [1]ax := a → [1]x (as this
transformation preserves complete additivity).
5.1 The van Benthem Logic
We are now ready to prove that the logic vB of § 2, the smallest normal modal logic
containing ♦⊤ → ((p→ p)→ p), is V-incomplete. To state this result in a more
general form, let us borrow notation from Cresswell [1984]: let ID be the logic of the van
Benthem frame VB from Definition 2.2 (see § 6.1 for an explanation of this name).
Theorem 5.2. Any logic between vB and ID is V-incomplete.
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Proof. By Theorem 5.1, taking 〈1〉 = 〈0〉 = ♦ (and hence [1] = [0] = ) and a := ♦⊤,
any V-bao that validates vB is such that ♦⊤ ≤ ⊥, so it validates ♦⊤ → ⊥.
However, by Lemma 2.3, ♦⊤ → ⊥ 6∈ L for any logic L contained in ID. Since vB is
contained in ID by Lemma 2.3, the theorem follows. ⊣
We have now come a long way from the initial Kripke-incompleteness results, i.e.,
CAV-incompleteness results, of the 1970s. It turns out that each of the properties C
[Litak, 2004], A [Venema, 2003], and finally V gives rise to incompleteness by itself.
Next, we will show that there are syntactically consistent bimodal logics that are V-
inconsistent in the sense that they are not even sound with respect to any V-bao. This
is not possible in the unimodal case, since by Makinson’s Theorem [Makinson, 1971],
every normal unimodal logic is sound with respect to a Kripke frame—either the single
reflexive point or the single irreflexive point—and hence with respect to a CAV-bao.
For the V-inconsistency result, consider a bimodal language with modalities  and [e]
and let vBe be the smallest normal logic in this language containing the vB-axiom for
 and the axiom 〈e〉(♦⊤ ∧ ♦⊤). In addition, let VBE be the general frame for the
same language that extends VB such that the accessibility relation for 〈e〉 in VBE is
the universal relation on the frame. Finally, let IDe be the logic of VBE .
Theorem 5.3.
1. Any logic extending vBe (in particular IDe) is V-inconsistent, yet vBe is consistent.
2. Any logic extended by IDe (in particular vBe) is A-consistent, and IDe is A-
complete.
Note that we will prove more powerful results in Theorem 6.1 and Corollary 6.2.
Proof. For the V-inconsistency of extensions of vBe, by the proof of Theorem 5.2, every
V-bao that validates the vB-axiom for  is such that♦⊤∧♦⊤ = ⊥, so 〈e〉(♦⊤∧♦⊤) =
⊥. For the consistency of vBe, observe that VBE validates vBe.
For part 2, observe that the bao underlying VBE is atomic. ⊣
The logic vB was introduced by van Benthem to prove a point about modal incom-
pleteness, which we have pushed all the way to V-incompleteness. Theorem 5.2 raises
the question: are there also “naturally occurring” examples of V-incomplete logics?
As soon as we have at least two modal operators at our disposal, the answer turns out
to be an emphatic “yes”.
5.2 The Provability Logic GLB
To motivate the main logic of this section, we recall that formulas of propositional modal
logic can be translated into sentences of Peano Arithmetic (PA) as follows: map each
atomic pn to a sentence of arithmetic, send the modal  to the arithmetized provability
predicate Bew of PA, and make the translation commute with the Boolean connectives
in the obvious way. Solovay [1976] showed that the modal logic GL, the smallest normal
modal logic containing the Lo¨b axiom (p → p) → p is arithmetically sound and
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complete: a modal formula ϕ is a theorem of GL iff for every mapping of atomic sentences
pn to sentences of arithmetic, the induced arithmetic translation of ϕ is a theorem of
PA. Thus, GL captures the logic of the provability predicate of PA.
Japaridze [1988] introduced a polymodal extension of GL, the bimodal version of which
we will treat here. Let us interpret a bimodal language with operators [0] and [1] in the
language of PA by sending [0] to the provability predicate Bew of PA as before and
sending [1] to a predicate ωBew encoding provability from PA with one application of the
ω-rule.14 A sentence σ of arithmetic is provable in PA with one application of the ω-rule
if for some formula ϕ(x), PA proves ∀xϕ(x) → σ and proves ϕ(n) for every numeral n.
The bimodal system that captures the combined logic of provability and ω-provability
in PA is the smallest normal bimodal logic containing the following axioms:
(i) [n]([n]p→ p)→ [n]p for n = 0, 1;
(ii) [0]p→ [1]p;
(iii) 〈0〉p → [1]〈0〉p.
Japaridze [1988] proved that this logic, now known as GLB [Boolos, 1993], is arithmeti-
cally sound and complete in the sense analogous to that of GL above.
While GL is Kripke complete [Segerberg, 1971], GLB is Kripke incomplete (Japaridze
1988, see also Boolos 1993, p. 194). To see this, recall that over Kripke frames, the Lo¨b
axiom (i) for [n] corresponds to the associated accessibility relation Rn being transitive
and Noetherian (conversely well-founded); axiom (ii), which we can equivalently take in
the diamond form 〈1〉q → 〈0〉q, corresponds to the property that xR1y implies xR0y;
and axiom (iii) corresponds to the property that if xR0y and xR1y
′, then y′R0y.
Such a combination of axioms, however, makes R1 an empty relation. Suppose there
are x, y for which xR1y in some Kripke frame for GLB. Hence xR0y by the property
corresponding to axiom (ii). Then using xR0y, xR1y, and the property corresponding
to axiom (iii), we obtain yR0y, which contradicts the Noetherianity of R0 given by the
Lo¨b axiom for [0] (note that the argument does not use the Lo¨b axiom for [1]). But
Japaridze’s arithmetical soundness theorem for GLB shows that [1]⊥ is not a theorem of
GLB (a semantic argument can be extracted from Theorem 5.5 below). Thus, [1]⊥ is a
non-theorem of GLB that is valid in all Kripke frames for GLB.
Viewed algebraically, Japaridze’s Kripke-incompleteness result shows that GLB is
CAV-incomplete. Beklemishev et al. [2010] show that GLB is complete with respect
to a class of topological spaces, which implies that it is CA-complete. In light of this
result, it is a natural question whether the CAV-incompleteness of GLB is due to the
interaction of V with the other properties or whether it is due to the property V by
itself. Using the equivalence of V and R from § 4, we are able to answer this question
and show that V by itself is to blame.
Theorem 5.4. The logic GLB is V-incomplete.
14Equivalently, ωBew encodes provability from PA together with all Π01 arithmetical truths.
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Proof. First, for any bao A validating GLB and any x ∈ A, we have
[1]([0]([0]x → x)→ x) = ⊤,
because
〈1〉([0]([0]x → x) ∧ ¬x) ≤ 〈1〉([0]x ∧ ¬x) by the Lo¨b axiom for [0]
≤ 〈1〉[0]x ∧ 〈1〉¬x
≤ 〈1〉[0]x ∧ 〈0〉¬x by axiom (ii) of GLB
≤ 〈1〉[0]x ∧ [1]〈0〉¬x by axiom (iii) of GLB
≤ ⊥.
Thus, if A is a V-bao, then we can apply Theorem 5.1 with a := ⊤ to obtain ⊤ ≤ [1]⊥.
Yet as noted above, [1]⊥ 6∈ GLB. ⊣
Note that this proof uses the complete additivity only of the [1] operator, so it shows
that GLB is in fact V1-incomplete in the sense of Remark 3.4. Similar remarks apply to
later results involving variants of GLB, though we will not mention this again.
We can get still more mileage out of this result by following the pattern of Theorem
5.3 to obtain a somewhat more “natural” logic answering the V-inconsistency question
of Venema [2007, § 6.1]. As in the case of vB, the problematic formula derivable over
V-baos for GLB is variable free. Therefore, let us define GLBe as the smallest normal
modal logic in the language with three modalities [0], [1] and [e] containing the GLB
axioms for [0] and [1] as above as well as the axiom 〈e〉〈1〉⊤.
Theorem 5.5. The logic GLBe is consistent (and even sound with respect to the ordinal
version of the topological GLB-semantics of Beklemishev et al. 2010, Beklemishev 2011)
but V-inconsistent.
Proof sketch. Given Theorem 5.4, it is enough to prove the parenthetical claim. Recall
that the topological semantics for GLB is defined in terms of spaces with two suitably
related scattered topologies; diamonds are interpreted by the derived set operator rather
than Kuratowski’s closure operator.15 Ordinals provide particularly important instances
of GLB-spaces, with [0] interpreted by the order topology and [1] by the club topology.
In order to extend this semantics to GLBe, it is enough to interpret [e], e.g., with the
interior operator of the trivial topology on any α ≥ ℵω. ⊣
One may hope to find not only a good topological interpretation but also a good
arithmetical interpretation of 〈e〉 validating 〈e〉〈1〉⊤. This would make GLBe a natural
example of V-inconsistency among normal logics. As things stand now, we have at
least an extraordinarily natural example of V-incompleteness in Theorem 5.4. And for
V-inconsistency, we can do better than GLBe in the quasi-normal realm of § 5.3.
15For all the notions undefined in this proof, see Beklemishev and Gabelaia 2014.
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5.3 V-Inconsistency of GLSB
If one is willing to broaden somewhat the setup of the present paper, a very natural
example of V-inconsistency can be found among modal logics without the necessitation
rule. In analogy with § 2, given a normal modal logic L ⊇ K, we can define Σ ⊢mu
L
ϕ to
mean that ϕ belongs to the closure of L∪Σ under modus ponens and uniform substitution.
A set of formulas closed under ⊢mu
L
is called a quasi-normal logic over L or simply a quasi-
normal L-logic. If L = K, we simply use the name quasi-normal logic. These notions
transfer without any changes to the polymodal setting.
Algebraic semantics for these quasi-normal logics has been well investigated. One
can find a standard presentation in, e.g., Chagrov and Zakharyaschev 1997, Ch. 7; an
early exhaustive discussion is provided by Blok and Ko¨hler [1983], who indicate that
the basic notion of a filtered modal algebra is a special case of the notion of a matrix
that dates back to the pre-war work of the Warsaw school.16 As discussed by Jansana
[2006], non-normal modal logics were an important inspiration for Blok’s later work on
abstract algebraic logic, and more generally, such logics have been a major source of
examples and applications in the area (see Blok and Pigozzi 1989, Andre´ka et al. 2001,
Czelakowski 2001, Font 2006, Font et al. 2003, 2009).
Instead of reproducing the whole apparatus here, let us just recall what is most relevant
for our purposes. In this section, we are only interested in quasi-normal logics where
each box operator obeys the Lo¨b axiom. baos in which each dual operator validates the
Lo¨b axiom are called diagonalizable baos (also known as Magari algebras).
Let A be a bao. Recall that a non-empty subset F ⊆ A is called a filter if
• for any a, b ∈ A, a, b ∈ F iff a ∧ b ∈ F .
F is proper if F 6= A. A maximal proper filter is called an ultrafliter.
Let L be a quasi-normal Lo¨b logic, i.e., a quasi-normal, polymodal logic such that for
any 〈n〉 in the signature, the unimodal restriction of L to 〈n〉 is an extension of GL. We
say that a pair 〈A, F 〉 is a matrix for L if
• A is a diagonalizable bao and F is a filter on it, and
• for any ϕ ∈ L (i.e., any theorem of L) and any valuation θ on A, θˆ(ϕ) ∈ F .
It is a standard fact (see the references above) that every quasi-normal Lo¨b logic L is
sound and complete with respect to its class of matrices.
We can apply our terminology for baos to matrices as well: 〈A, F 〉 is a C-, A-, V-matrix
if A is a C-, A-, V-bao. A matrix is degenerate if F is not proper, i.e., if F = A.
Quasi-normal modal logics arise naturally in the context of provability logic. Say that
a formula ϕ of the language of GLB is always true if for every mapping of atomic formulas
16“A well-known result, going back to the twenties, states that, under some reasonable assumptions, any
logic can be characterized as the set of formulas satisfied by a matrix 〈S, F 〉, where S is an algebra
of the appropriate type, and F a subset of the domain . . . ” [Blok and Ko¨hler, 1983, p. 941]. In this
opening quote, Blok and Ko¨hler were presumably referring to  Lukasiewicz and Tarski [1930]. The
exact references and more history can be found, e.g., in Font et al. 2003, § 1.2.
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to sentences of arithmetic, the induced arithmetic translation of ϕ is true in the standard
model of arithmetic. Then we may ask for a bimodal logic L such that ϕ ∈ L iff ϕ is
always true. Clearly L must be an extension of GLB that is closed under modus ponens
and uniform substitution and contains the axioms [n]p → p. But then L cannot be
closed under necessitation, since that would give us [0]([0]⊥ → ⊥) as a theorem, which
is not an always true formula by Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem. The desired
logic L is the logic GLSB [Boolos, 1993], which can be defined as the quasi-normal logic
axiomatized over GLB by [1]p → p. Japaridze [1988] proved that GLSB is exactly the
logic of the always true sentences about provability and ω-provability. As it turns out,
this logic also provides a quasi-normal example of V-inconsistency.
Theorem 5.6. There exists no non-degenerate V-matrix for GLSB.
Proof. Assume 〈A, F 〉 is a V-matrix for GLSB. Then F has to contain all instances of
[1]ϕ → ϕ, in particular [1]⊥ → ⊥ = 〈1〉⊤. But as shown in the proof of Theorem 5.4,
⊤ ≤ [1]⊥ holds in any V-bao validating GLB, so the matrix is degenerate. ⊣
Remark 5.7. One may wonder if we could obtain such a result in the unimodal setting.
While it would be possible to obtain examples of V-inconsistent quasi-normal unimodal
logics using, e.g., vB again, the natural candidate in one’s mind is probably GLS [Boolos,
1993], the logic of always true sentences about plain provability in PA. It is well known
that this logic does not allow any Kripke semantics with distinguished worlds, and van
Benthem [1979, § 2.4] explicitly suggests that a related second-order derivation inspired
the axiom of vB. Interestingly, GLS allows V-matrices and even CAV-matrices. The
real reason why the logic is problematic for the distinguished worlds semantics is that
matrices associated with this semantics can only use principal filters. One can show that
each such matrix for GLS (not even necessarily a V-matrix) must be degenerate.
6 Decidability and Complexity
Nontrivial completeness notions such as the ones studied in this paper raise questions
about their relationship to decidability. Are there decidable logics, perhaps even of low
complexity, that fail to be complete in the given sense? Is it decidable whether a logic
is complete in this sense? Finally, is the associated notion of consequence recursively
axiomatizable, i.e., does it allow some decidable notion of proof?
Well-developed metatheory of modal logics leads us to the conclusion that for V-
completeness, the answers to these questions are, respectively, yes, no, and yes. In this
section, we discuss these answers in more detail.17
6.1 Decidable V-Incomplete Logics
The results of § 5 show that V-incomplete logics can easily be decidable. The existence
of Kripke-incomplete yet decidable logics is not a new observation; an early result of this
17Thanks to Johan van Benthem for inspiring this section with questions about complexity.
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kind was due to Cresswell [1984], who showed that the logic of the frame VB is Kripke-
incomplete but decidable—hence the name ‘ID’ for this logic. It follows by Theorem
5.2 that ID is an example of a decidable V-incomplete logic. (It is an open question,
suggested to us by Johan van Benthem, whether vB itself is decidable.) Theorem 5.4
provides another example, since GLB is known to be decidable [Boolos, 1993, p. 206].
This example is again perhaps more spectacular, given the motivation for GLB.
These examples raise follow-up questions. First, one may ask for an example of a
decidable V-inconsistent logic. Second, one may ask for bounds on the computational
complexity of V-incomplete/inconsistent logics.
On the question of complexity, Cresswell’s [1984] decidability proof for ID uses an
embedding into Rabin’s [1969] S2S, which is much too powerful to provide a meaningful
complexity bound. One can normally do much better. For a rather striking example,
Litak and Wolter [2005] show that all tense logics of linear time flows that are either
finitely axiomatizable or
⋂
-irreducible are coNP-complete. This class contains many
ωC-inconsistent logics, i.e., logics that are not sound with respect to any non-degenerate
bao closed under countable joins. And yet, it turns out that their complexity is no worse
than that of the classical propositional calculus. Similarly, it is possible to show that ID
is coNP-complete (see Corollary 6.2). In fact, however, one can prove a stronger result
that at the same time answers the first of the above questions: even V-inconsistent logics
do not have to be more complex than the Boolean calculus itself.
Theorem 6.1. IDe, the logic of the general frame VBE introduced in § 5.1, is coNP-
complete and V-inconsistent. Furthermore, in ZF + BPI (i.e., assuming the Boolean
Prime Ideal Theorem) it can be shown to be CA-complete.
Proof sketch. V-inconsistency was already stated in Theorem 5.3.1. For the complexity
claim, the crucial part of the proof is analogous to Lemma 4.3(a) in Litak and Wolter
2005. In more detail, for any m ∈ ω define the m-collapse VBEm of VBE as the
substructure induced by {∞ + 1,∞} ∪ {m, . . . , 0}. For a formula ϕ, let l(ϕ) be the
cardinality of nsub(ϕ): the single-negation-closed set of subformulas of ϕ. The crucial
observation is that the satisfiability of ϕ in VBE is equivalent to its satisfiability in the
l(ϕ)-collapse under a ϕ-good valuation, i.e., one such that for any χ ∈ nsub(ϕ), if χ
holds at ∞, then it also holds at some n ≤ l(ϕ). This is shown as follows:
• If ϕ is satisfied in VBE by a valuation V , then for each χ ∈ nsub(ϕ) satisfied in
[∞, 0], one picks the maximal18 point in this interval where χ holds (note this is
never∞!). One then defines a morphism from VBE l(ϕ) to VBE such that all these
maximal points are in the codomain, which yields a valuation in VBE l(ϕ) via the
inverse image. By definition, the obtained valuation is ϕ-good, and one can show
inductively that satisfiability of formulas in nsub(ϕ) is preserved and reflected.
• Conversely, given a good valuation in VBE l(ϕ), one takes this collapse as a sub-
structure of VBE (identifying corresponding “infinity points” and points with
18Note this is the only difference with respect to Litak and Wolter 2005, where one needed to pick both
maximal and minimal elements (and thus duplicate the size of the model) due to the presence of
past modalities. Our simplified proof has the flavor of the selection-of-points argument for GL.3.
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corresponding natural indices) and extends the valuation to the whole of VBE
by copying the values of all propositional variables from ∞ to all remaining natu-
ral numbers. Preservation and reflection of satisfiability of formulas in nsub(ϕ) is
ensured by the ϕ-goodness of the valuation.
The proof of the complexity claim is finished in the same way as for Theorem 2.1(ii) in
Litak and Wolter 2005: given any ϕ, we simply guess a valuation in the l(ϕ)-collapse,
whose size is bounded by l(ϕ)+3, i.e., polynomial in ϕ. Checking its ϕ-goodness and the
satisfaction of ϕ itself under this valuation can be done in polynomial time. And coNP-
hardness does not require much justification: IDe contains the propositional calculus.
Finally, regarding CA-completeness, assuming BPI: one can follow Wolter [1993, § 4.6]
and Litak [2005a, § 4.4] and modify VBE = 〈W,R,W〉 to VBE ′ = 〈W,R,W′〉, where
W′ is obtained by fixing a non-principal ultrafilter U over N and setting
W′ = {X ⊆W | X ∩ N 6∈ U and ∞ 6∈ X} ∪ {X ⊆W | X ∩ N ∈ U and ∞ ∈ X}.
All that one needs to finish the proof is to show that VBE and VBE ′ satisfy the same
formulas, and this can be done by extending the equivalence proved by the two bullet
points above to the following equivalence: ϕ is satisfiable in VBE iff ϕ is satisfiable in
VBE l(ϕ) under a ϕ-good valuation iff ϕ is satisfiable in VBE
′. ⊣
Corollary 6.2. ID, the unimodal logic investigated in Cresswell 1984, is coNP-complete
and V-incomplete. Furthermore, in ZF + BPI (i.e., assuming the Boolean Prime Ideal
Theorem) it can be shown to be CA-complete.
Proof. This is a straightforward corollary of Theorems 5.2 and 6.1. The CA-completeness
claim follows from the fact that the unimodal fragment of IDe is exactly ID; it can also be
shown directly as in the proof of Theorem 6.1 (just neglecting the universal modality). ⊣
This improvement on Cresswell 1984 shows why using methods as powerful as em-
bedding into Rabin’s [1969] S2S to show decidability should be regarded as either the
first step or the last resort. More tailored methods can yield dramatically improved
complexity bounds and as a bonus help to establish en route additional completeness
results. Furthermore, “tailored” should not be taken to mean “applicable to a single
isolated system”. These points are illustrated, again, by tense logics of linear time flows.
The methods used in the general complexity result of Litak and Wolter [2005] were de-
veloped in the course of an earlier thorough investigation of the lattice of these logics by
Wolter [1996a,b]. As pointed out in Litak 2005a, Chapter 8, these methods also allow
us to show AT -completeness of all such logics and to find an example of a logic that is
κC-complete for any cardinal κ, yet C-inconsistent.19 As in Theorem 6.1 and Corollary
6.2, fine-grained investigation of complexity and completeness seem to go hand in hand.
19Wolter and Zakharyaschev [2006, §§ 6.2 & 7] present the results of Wolter [1996a,b] and
Litak and Wolter [2005] as examples that the Big Programme or globalist’s dream, whose general
failure we mention in § 6.3 below, may fare better in restricted lattices of logics.
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Remark 6.3. We could take a cue from the tense example and generalize the results in
this section to a broader class of V-incomplete logics. For example, Wolter [1993, §4.3]
defines a whole chain of similar logics. However, doing so would require a somewhat
better motivation for classes of logics obtained in this way.20 We thus suggest just one
modification: the point ∞ + 1 in the frame VBE and the antecedent ♦⊤ in the vB-
axiom are of little use in the bimodal case. As explicitly discussed by van Benthem
[1979], these contraptions were only used to get things working in the normal unimodal
setting. Thus, if we give up the goal of staying as close as possible to van Benthem
[1979] and Cresswell [1984], then we could modify VBE and IDe accordingly: removing
∞+1, interpreting 〈e〉 by W ×{∞} rather than the universal relation, and noting that
[e]((p → p) → p) and 〈e〉⊤ happen to be valid in the resulting general frame. The
proof of V-inconsistency would then just be a direct application of Theorem 5.1. We
leave adapting Theorem 6.1 to this example as an exercise for the reader.
To close the discussion of complexity, let us note that GLB, our other flagship example
of V-incompleteness, is PSPACE-complete, as is the case with many other provability
logics: on the one hand, the one-variable fragment of GL alone is PSPACE-complete
[Chagrov and Rybakov, 2003, Sˇvejdar, 2003], and on the other hand even the polymodal
extension GLP of GLB with ω-many modalities remains in PSPACE [Shapirovsky, 2008].
6.2 Undecidability of V-Completeness
A more general question is whether the property of V-completeness itself is decidable.
Recall that Thomason [1982] showed that it is undecidable whether a given (finite set
of) axiom(s) axiomatizes a Kripke-complete logic. Further results along these lines
can be found in, e.g., Kracht and Wolter 1999 or Chagrov and Zakharyaschev 1997.
Refinements include the discussion of decidability of Kripke completeness in smaller
lattices of logics. In particular, Chagrov [1990] (see also Chagrov and Zakharyaschev
1997, Theorem 17.19) shows that Kripke completeness is undecidable over GL.
Adopting Thomason’s technique to show the undecidability of V-completeness for
polymodal logics in general is straightforward; as discussed by Kracht and Wolter [1999],
all that one really needs to show is its reflection under fusions.21
In fact, as highlighted by Kracht and Wolter [1999, p. 137], Thomason’s methodology
is of sweeping generality, and one could even call it a modal variant of Rice’s Theorem.22
Let us isolate this result. Recall that the fusion L1 ⊗ L2 of two normal logics L1 and L2
formulated in disjoint modal signatures is obtained by taking the sum of their theorems
and closing it under the axioms and rules of polymodal K in the combined signature.
20Wolter [1993] was investigating the fine structure and properties of the lattice of subframe logics, a
subject beyond our interest here.
21We refer the reader to, e.g., Kracht and Wolter 1991 for more on preservation and reflection of prop-
erties of modal logics by fusions.
22Recall that Rice’s Theorem [1953] states that every nontrivial property of recursively axiomatizable lan-
guages is undecidable [Hopcroft et al., 2003, Theorem 9.11]. Note that Chagrov and Zakharyaschev
[1993] take a somewhat different perspective on the relationship of Rice’s Theorem to modal logic,
focusing mostly on unimodal systems.
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This notion is extended to arbitrary logics with possibly overlapping signatures by trivial
renaming of operators to ensure disjointness. We say that a property of polymodal
normal logics P is
• reflected by fusions if L1 ∈ P and L2 ∈ P whenever L1 ⊗ L2 ∈ P , and
• finitely nontrivial if the inconsistent logic in every signature has P but there is at
least one finitely axiomatizable L 6∈ P .
Theorem 6.4 (Thomason [1982], Kracht and Wolter [1999]). Any finitely nontrivial
property of polymodal logics that is reflected by fusions is undecidable for normal modal
logics with at least three operators.
Proof. The proof boils down to Thomason’s [1982] result that it is undecidable whether
a formula with at least two modal operators axiomatizes a consistent normal logic. ⊣
For the next statement, recall the notion of a (modal) reduct of a bao. Assume that
A is a bao for the signature where the set of operators extending Boolean operations is
SI = {♦i}i∈I . Consider any subset J ⊆ I. Clearly, A can be modified to a bao A
J whose
set of operators extending Boolean operations is SJ = {♦i}i∈J , simply by forgetting the
interpretations of operators with indices in I − J . Such an AJ is a (modal) reduct of A.
Consider a property X of baos. If for any A ∈ X and any J ⊆ I, we have AJ ∈ X , we
say X is preserved by modal reducts. It is not a high bar to clear; in fact, it would be
hard to come up with a natural property not preserved by reducts.
Corollary 6.5. Let X be any property of baos that is preserved by modal reducts. If
the property of X -completeness is finitely nontrivial, then it is undecidable for normal
modal logics with at least three operators.
Proof. Preservation of X by modal reducts implies that the associated notion of com-
pleteness is reflected by fusions. ⊣
Corollary 6.6. V-completeness is undecidable for normal modal logics with at least
three operators (recall Remark 3.4).
Proof. The property V of complete additivity is preserved by modal reducts, and V-
completeness is finitely nontrivial. ⊣
Corollary 6.7. V-completeness is undecidable for any class of normal unimodal logics
containing the Thomason-simulation logic Sim(3) [Kracht, 1999, § 6.8] (also denoted by
Sim(3, 1) in Kracht and Wolter 1999, § 9).
Proof sketch. As discussed by Thomason [1982] and Kracht and Wolter [1999], one needs
to establish that the property in question transfers under simulations such as those
presented by Thomason [1974b,c] and Kracht and Wolter [1999]. This is indeed the case
for the property V. The details of the argument are analogous to those of the proof
of Theorem 2.51 in Holliday 2015, which is dealing with CV rather than V; lattice-
completeness plays no role in the argument. ⊣
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The question of the decidability of V-completeness in more restricted lattices of logics
is much less trivial. We have no evidence of the existence of V-incomplete logics in the
lattice of extensions of unimodal K4, much less GL. Thus, it might be that this property
is decidable for such logics in a degenerate sense, which would provide a rather dramatic
contrast with Chagrov 1990.
6.3 Recursive Axiomatizability of V-Consequence
Results such as Theorem 6.4 show the ultimate unfeasibility of what Wolter and Za-
kharyaschev [2006] call the Big Programme or globalist’s dream23 and claim to be an
implicit motivation for much of the early work in modal logic. An earlier blow to this
program was delivered by Thomason’s [1975a] reduction of monadic second-order conse-
quence to modal Kripke-frame consequence. To borrow a phrase from Blackburn et al.
[2001], this result showed that no strengthening of our deductive apparatus can elimi-
nate frame incompleteness. It is not just that CAV-consequence fails to be recursively
axiomatizable and hence does not allow any decidable notion of proof; it is beyond the
entire arithmetical hierarchy.
We have seen (and will see even better in § 7) that many negative results regarding
Kripke completeness hold as well for V-completeness, just as they turned out to hold for
other algebraically-inspired weak notions of completeness [Litak, 2005a,b, 2008]. How-
ever, there is also an important contrast: while the class CAV is not a first-order definable
class of baos, we have seen that V, like A, AV, and T , is first-order definable, which
gives us the following positive result in contrast to CAV-consequence.
Corollary 6.8. The consequence relation V over V-baos is recursively axiomatizable.
The difference, of course, boils down to the strong completeness of first-order logic.
The desired recursive axiomatization of the consequence relation and a decidable notion
of proof is provided by using the obvious translation of the modal language into the
algebraic correspondence language provided in the course of the algebraization process.24
This, to be sure, is a suboptimal argument. One would like to avoid stepping so far
outside the ordinary modal syntax, especially since deductions in the first-order metalan-
guage for baos can involve sentences with arbitrary nesting of quantifiers. Indeed, one
can do better for many FO-definable properties of baos, especially those definable by
∀∃∀-sentences like AV (see § 8.2), T (see § 8.3) or A (see Litak 2006). The general theme
of finding better “internalizations” of consequence relations is the leitmotif of §§ 8–9,
with § 9 entirely devoted to V-consequence. For more material on the “internalization”
process, we also refer the reader to Holliday and Litak 2018.
23 As Wolter and Zakharyaschev [2006, p. 428] describe it, “Although not formulated explicitly, the
‘globalist’s’ dream research programme was to develop a mathematical machinery that could . . .
[e.g.,] given a modal logic in the form of a finite set of axioms and inference rules, characterise the
(simplest, smallest, largest, etc.) class of models/structures with respect to which this logic is sound
and complete, decide in an effective way whether it has important properties. . . [such as decidability,
compactness, interpolation] and determine its computational complexity.”
24Obviously, this argument goes well beyond logics with the classical propositional base [Rasiowa, 1974,
Blok and Pigozzi, 1989, Andre´ka et al., 2001, Font, 2006, Font et al., 2003, 2009].
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7 The Blok Dichotomy
We recalled in § 6.3 that Thomason’s [1975a] reduction of monadic second-order logic to
modal Kripke-frame consequence was one of the two biggest blows the 1970s delivered to
what Wolter and Zakharyaschev [2006] call the Big Programme or globalist’s dream of
the 1960s. The other one was delivered by Blok [1978], with what has come to be called
the Blok Dichotomy. An analysis of sub-Kripkean completeness notions shows that these
two results have nothing whatsoever to do which each other: the Blok Dichotomy can
still obtain even where no Thomason-style result holds. In this section, we will show
that V-completeness and V-consequence is perhaps the most dramatic case in point.25
7.1 Blok Dichotomy for Kripke Incompleteness
Our goal is to prove the Blok Dichotomy for V-incompleteness. In order to explain what
this means, we need to review some basic notions.
Fine [1974] defined the degree of Kripke incompleteness of a normal modal logic L to
be the cardinality of the set of normal modal logics L′ such that L and L′ are valid over
exactly the same class of Kripke frames. Only one of the logics L′ in that set can be
Kripke complete, namely Log(Fr(L)). If L is Kripke incomplete, then its degree of Kripke
incompleteness is ≥ 2, since L and Log(Fr(L)) are distinct logics valid over exactly the
same Kripke frames. In this case Log(Fr(L)) is a Kripke complete logic with degree of
incompleteness ≥ 2. By contrast, the logic K, which is the logic of the class of all frames,
has degree of incompleteness 1. Such logics are said to be strictly Kripke complete.
Earlier Kripke incompleteness results showed that there are normal modal logics with
degree of Kripke incompleteness ≥ 2, and Fine noted that a normal modal logic with
degree of incompleteness 2ℵ0 could be produced. Fine then asked what cardinalities may
be degrees of Kripke incompleteness and whether there are any strictly complete normal
modal logics other than K.
Blok [1978] provided an exact and surprising answer to these questions: the only
strictly complete normal modal logics can be characterized in terms of their occupying
a special position in the lattice of all normal modal logics; and all other normal modal
logics have degree of incompleteness 2ℵ0 , i.e., each one of them shares the same class of
Kripke frames with 2ℵ0 Kripke-incomplete logics.
To say what the special position of the strictly complete logics is, we recall that the
set of all normal modal logics, ordered by inclusion, forms a complete distributive lattice
L: the meet of a family of logics is their intersection; the join of a family of logics is the
smallest normal modal logic that includes each logic in the family (which might strictly
extend the union of the family); the bottom element of L is K; and the top element
is the set L of all formulas. In this lattice L, a pair 〈L1, L2〉 of normal modal logics is
called a splitting pair iff for every logic L in L, either L ⊆ L1 or L2 ⊆ L, but not both,
i.e., L2 6⊆ L1. Thus, 〈L1, L2〉 splits L into two disjoint parts. Note that if 〈L1, L2〉 is a
splitting pair, then either member of the pair determines the other uniquely. A logic L2
25Previously known examples included AV (Litak 2005a, 2008) and T (Zakharyaschev et al. 2001, Litak
2005a, 2008), i.e., subclasses of V, and ωC (Litak 2005a, 2008), which is not an FO-definable property.
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is a splitting of L iff there is a logic L1 in L such that 〈L1, L2〉 is a splitting pair. For L2
to be a splitting is equivalent to it being completely join-irreducible in the usual sense
of lattice theory: L2 cannot be obtained as the join of a family of logics all of which
are distinct from L2. Finally, a logic is a join-splitting of L iff it is a join of a family of
splittings, or equivalently, of completely join-irreducible logics.
Two important facts about splitting logics were established by Blok en route to his
main result. We will also need them below and hence we single out these two facts as a
separate lemma. Recall that a normal modal logic L is finitely approximable iff there is
a class F of finite Kripke frames such that L = Log(F), which is equivalent to L having
the finite model property (see Chagrov and Zakharyaschev 1997, Thm. 8.47).
Lemma 7.1 (Blok 1978).
1. All join-splittings are finitely approximable;
2. If a finite Kripke frame F is cycle free, then Log(F ) splits the lattice of normal
modal logics: there is an L2 such that 〈Log(F ), L2〉 is a splitting pair.
Blok’s [1978] main result can now be stated precisely as follows.
Theorem 7.2 (Blok Dichotomy for Kripke frames). If a consistent normal modal logic
is a join-splitting, then it is strictly Kripke complete; otherwise it has degree of Kripke
incompleteness 2ℵ0 .
Proof. Apart from the original proof by Blok [1978], one can consult numerous more re-
cent references, in particular Chagrov and Zakharyaschev 1997, Chagrova 1998, Kracht
1999, Zakharyaschev et al. 2001, Litak 2005b, Rautenberg et al. 2006, Wolter and Zakharyaschev
2006, Litak 2008. ⊣
Given the duality between Kripke frames and CAV-baos, Theorem 7.2 can be equiva-
lently stated in terms of degrees of CAV-incompleteness. Below we will extend Theorem
7.2 to degrees of V-incompleteness, thereby showing that neither of the properties C or
A of the duals of Kripke frames are necessary for the Blok Dichotomy.
7.2 Maximal Consistent Logics
The degree of V-incompleteness of a normal modal logic L is the cardinality of the set of
normal modal logics L′ such that L and L′ are valid over exactly the same V-baos.
Following the pattern of the proofs quoted in the proof of Theorem 7.2, before we
generalize the theorem itself, we consider two special cases and then use proofs of these
special cases in the proof of the main theorem. Recall that by Makinson’s Theorem
[Makinson, 1971], the two maximal consistent unimodal normal logics are Triv (the logic
of the reflexive point) and Ver (the logic of the irreflexive point).
Theorem 7.3. The degree of V-incompleteness of Ver is continuum.
All the details of the proof can be lifted directly from Litak 2008, § 8, modulo corrected
typos in that proof, adjusted notation, and V replacing T , AV, or the sum theoreof. For
the sake of completeness, we reproduce the argument here.
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Figure 2: The frame VBI for I = {2, 4, 5, . . .}.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary I ⊆ ω − {0, 1}. For i > 1, define
ai
• :=
{
{ai} if i 6∈ I,
{ai, a
′
i} if i ∈ I.
Now let VBI := 〈WI , RI ,FI〉, where (see Figure 2):
• WI := {b} ∪ {c} ∪
⋃
k∈ω
ak
•;
• RI := {〈c, b〉} ∪ ({b} ×
⋃
k∈ω
ak
•) ∪
⋃
k>l>1
(ak
• × al
•) ∪ {〈a1, a0〉} ∪ {〈a1, c〉};
• FI consists of finite sets that do not contain b and their complements.
Let vBI denote the logic of VBI , i.e., the set of all modal formulas valid over VBI . We
will prove that
• distinct I ⊆ ω produce distinct vBI , but
• all of these logics share the same class of V-baos with Ver.
First, let us define the following sequences of formulas,26 which will provide names of
points of VBI :
α0(p) := p
α1(p) := ♦α0(p) ∧
2¬α0(p)
αk+2(p) := ♦αk+1(p) ∧
2¬αk+1(p) ∧ ♦α1(p)
ai := αi(⊥)
γ(p) := ♦2α1(p) ∧ ¬♦α1(p)
c := γ(⊥).
26We use the convention that if ξ(p) is a formula containing p and µ is a formula, then ξ(µ) is the result
of substituting µ for all occurrences of p in ξ(p).
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Moreover, for arbitrary ϕ, let α1ϕ := (♦·a1 → ϕ). Note that this is a normal modality,
with its dual ♦α1ϕ := ♦(♦· a1 ∧ ϕ). Recall that ♦· ϕ is ϕ ∨ ♦ϕ and its dual operator is
⊡ϕ := ϕ ∧ϕ.
For arbitrary I ⊆ ω − {0, 1}, k ∈ ω, and an arbitrary valuation V on VBI , we have
that V (ak) = ak
• and V (c) = {c}. Hence, for arbitrary i ∈ ω,
VBI  (ai → p) ∨(ai → ¬p) iff i 6∈ I,
and thus vBI = vBJ iff I = J .
Second, define
ǫ := a0 ∨ ♦·
2a1
ζ := a1 → ♦c
η := c→ (α1(α1p→ p)→ p).
Let λ be the conjunction of these three formulas. Now notice that:
• For arbitrary I ⊆ ω − {0, 1}, VBI  λ.
• For arbitrary A ∈ V with A  λ, A  a0.
The first of these claims follows from the definitions of VBI and a0, a1 and c, so the
second is all we need to finish the proof. Assume for reductio that in a V-bao where λ
holds, we have that a0 6= ⊤. Observe that a1 6= ⊥ by ǫ and hence c 6= ⊥ by ζ; and by
definition, c ≤ ♦2a1. But by picking a := c, [0] := α1 , and [1] :=  in Theorem 5.1, we
also get that c ≤ ⊥. Thus,
c ≤ ⊥∧ ♦2a1 ≤ ⊥∧ ♦⊤ = ⊥,
a contradiction. ⊣
Theorem 7.4. The degree of V-incompleteness of Triv is continuum.
Proof. This time, we cannot use variable-free formulas. However, the rest of the proof
will be remarkably similar to that of Theorem 7.3, including the use of a family of frames
{VB◦I}I⊆ω, the only modification compared to {VBI}I⊆ω being that a0 is now taken to
be reflexive. In fact, the proof is entirely analogous to that of Chagrov and Zakharyaschev
1997, Example 10.58, with the only minor differences stemming from a slightly more eco-
nomical way we chose to define our frame (as in Litak 2008).
Note that if a formula
ζ(p) := ♦· 3p ∧ ♦· 3¬p
is satisfied at some point of VB◦I under some valuation V , then
α1(p) := (♦ ⊡
3 p ∧ ♦· 3¬p) ∨ (♦ ⊡3 ¬p ∧ ♦· 3p)
is satisfied at a1 and nowhere else under the same valuation V . Formulas {αi(p)}i≥1
and γ(p) can now be taken verbatim from the proof of Theorem 7.3 and characterize
corresponding points under V . Hence, for arbitrary i ∈ ω,
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VB
◦
I  ζ(p)→ (⊡
3(αi(p)→ q) ∨⊡
3(αi(p)→ ¬q)) iff i 6∈ I,
and thus vB◦I = vB
◦
J iff I = J .
Now take λ◦ to be the conjunction of
ǫ◦ := ζ(p)→ ♦· 3γ(p)
η◦ := γ(p)→ (α1(α1q → q)→ q),
note its validity over arbitrary vB◦I , and use Theorem 5.1 to finish the proof in exactly
the same way as we did in Theorem 7.3. ⊣
7.3 Blok Dichotomy for V-Incompleteness
We can now finally state and prove the general result for degrees of V-incompleteness.
Theorem 7.5. If a consistent normal modal logic L is not a join-splitting of the lattice
of normal modal logics, then L has degree of V-incompleteness 2ℵ0 .
One could argue that there is no need to provide all the details of the proof. While
Blok’s original construction was unsuitable for generalizations to most classes of algebras
containing CAV (see Dziobiak 1978 and in particular Litak 2005b, 2008 for a detailed dis-
cussion), a strategy proposed by Chagrov and Zakharyaschev in the 1990’s and followed
by most of the “recent references” quoted in lieu of the proof of Theorem 7.2 is much
more flexible. In particular, Chagrov and Zakharyaschev [1997], Zakharyaschev et al.
[2001], Litak [2005b], Rautenberg et al. [2006], Wolter and Zakharyaschev [2006] and
Litak [2008] show how to use vB and VB in proofs of the Blok Dichotomy and its gener-
alizations to notions like AV- and T -completeness. Apart from using the more general
argument of § 5, there is no significant conceptual difference in the present version. How-
ever, we still include a full proof to make the paper self-contained and to clarify how
Theorem 5.1 is used. In fact, we believe our presentation of the proof has some merits in
terms of clarity, accessibility, and polish, at least compared to earlier papers by Litak.
Proof. Assume L is not a join-splitting and L′ is the greatest join-splitting contained in
L, i.e., the join of all such join-splittings. By Lemma 7.1.1, L′ is finitely approximable.
Then since L′ ( L, there is a finite Kripke frame F = 〈W,R〉 for L′ that refutes some
ϕ ∈ L. Furthermore, there are several assumptions we can make about F :
(mings) We can choose F to be rooted (i.e., there exists r ∈ W such that every point
can be reached from r via the transitive closure of R) and such that every proper
generated subframe of F is a frame for L, by using standard preservation results
and the finiteness of F . In particular, ϕ is valid over any proper generated
subframe of F .
(mincc) In addition, using Lemma 7.1.2, we can assume that F contains a cycle, i.e., for
some k and some w0, . . . , wk−1 ∈W , we have w0Rw1R . . . Rwk−1Rw0. We can
obviously choose the cycle {wi}i<k to be minimal. In particular, either k = 1
(i.e., the cycle is of the form {w0}) or k > 1 and {wi}i<k contains no proper
subcycles, so all points are irreflexive.
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(single) Finally, by Makinson’s Theorem [Makinson, 1971], we also know that L is con-
tained in either Triv or Ver.
We are going to reuse the techniques and frames used in the proof of Theorem 7.3
or Theorem 7.4, depending on the subcase of (single) that holds. But first, we need to
transform F a little bit using the above assumptions, in particular (mincc). Let W ′
be W with the elements of {wi}i<k multiplied l := md(ϕ) + 1 times, where md is the
modal degree of a formula—the maximal number of nesting modalities. In other words,
{wi}i<k is replaced by {w
j
i }i<k, j<l. Note that wi can be identified with w
0
i ; formally, we
can define an embedding
f ′(w) :=
{
w0i if w = wi for some i < k
w otherwise,
but it is convenient to suppress the embedding in the notation. We can also define an
auxiliary surjective function f in the reverse direction:
f(w) :=
{
wi if w = w
j
i for some i < k, j < l,
w otherwise.
Clearly, for any w ∈ F , f(f ′(w)) = w. The accessibility relation on the extended frame
is defined as follows: for every u, v ∈W ′, uR′v if either
• v is not in the cycle and f(u)Rf(v), or
• u is not in the cycle and for some i < k, v = w0i and f(u)Rf(v), or
• for some j < l, i < k − 1, u = wji and v = w
j
i+1, or
• for some j < l, u = wjk−1 and v = w
(j+1)mod l
0 .
These definitions force that f is a bounded morphism, i.e., F is a bounded morphic
image of F ′ := 〈W ′, R′〉 via f .27 This, in turn, implies that
(*) for any valuation V in F , any w ∈ F , and any ψ, w ∈ V (ψ) iff w ∈ V ′(ψ),
where V ′(p) := f−1[V ′(p)] for every variable p. Moreover, using (mincc) we can show
that (*) holds for those ψ’s that are subformulas of ϕ even if 〈F ′, V ′〉 is replaced by any
model based on a frame G := 〈U,S〉 that contains F ′ as a (not necessarily generated)
subframe in such a way that for every v ∈ F ′ with v 6= wl−1k−1 and for every u ∈ U with
vSu, we have u ∈ F ′. In the words of Chagrov and Zakharyaschev [1997] (adjusted
to our notation), we can hook some other model on wl−1k−1 and points in F will not feel
its presence by means of ϕ’s subformulas. Our goal in expanding the cycle beyond the
modal depth of ϕ was precisely to guarantee this “insensitivity”.
Finally, let us set t := |W ′|+ 1.
27Note that f ′ is not a bounded morphism: F is not a generated subframe of F ′.
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Figure 3: Frame F •I (or F
◦
I , depending on reflexivity of e).
In order to proceed with the proof, we split (single) into two cases, depending on
whether or not L is contained in the logic of the single irreflexive point.
Case (single•): L ⊆ Ver. Fix I ⊆ ω − {0, 1}. Define F •I := 〈W
′
I , R
•
I ,F
′
I〉, depicted in
Figure 3, as follows:
W ′I := W
′ ∪ {d0, . . . , dt} ∪ {e} ∪WI − {a0},
where W ′ is defined as above and WI and a0 are as defined in the proof of Theorem 7.3,
R•I :=R
′ ∪ (RI ∩WI − {a0})∪
{〈di+1, di〉}i<v ∪
{〈d0, r〉} ∪ {〈d0, c〉} ∪ {〈d0, e〉}∪
{〈wl−1k−1, d0〉} ∪ {〈a1, dt〉},
and F′I consists of the sets of the form X ∪ Y , where X is an admissible subset of the
frame VBI defined in Theorem 7.3 and Y is a finite or cofinite subset of W
′
I −WI .
We begin by defining an auxiliary sequence of formulas, which will help to name points
from {dt, . . . , d0}:
δ0(p) := ♦p
δi+1(p) := ♦δi(p) ∧ ¬δi(p) ∧
∧
j<i
¬♦· δj(p)
di := δi(⊥).
Note that for i < t, di may also happen to be true somewhere in F
′. However, the
denotations of di and dj have to be disjoint whenever i 6= j. By the assumption on t, dt
cannot be true anywhere in F ′. It is easy to verify that it cannot hold anywhere inside
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the WI −{a0} part either, so dt is the only point in F
•
I where dt holds (the valuation is
irrelevant, as this is a variable-free formula).
Now recall {αi(p)}i∈ω and γ(p) from the proof of Theorem 7.3. We can reuse them to
redefine variable-free names for points from the WI − {a0} part as
ai := αi(dt) and c := γ(dt).
Define LI := {ψ ∈ L | F
•
I  ψ}. Fix a fresh q not occurring in ϕ, and recall that ϕ
can be refuted at r. Since for any i > 1,
((ai ∧ ♦·
i+m+1¬ϕ)→ q) ∨((ai ∧ ♦·
i+m+1¬ϕ)→ ¬q)
belongs to LI iff i 6∈ I, we have a continuum of distinct logics. We now want to show
that whenever A ∈ V validates LI , it also validates L. Assume otherwise, i.e., that there
is a ψ ∈ L such that A 2 ψ. By (single•), we have that ψ ∈ Ver. Hence, ψ cannot be
refuted at e. Furthermore, by the construction of F •I , the point d0 and hence any other
point in the frame can be reached from any point refuting ψ. Let l be a sufficiently large
number; note that, say, 2 · t+ 4 would do. Also, reuse the definition
α1ϕ := (♦· a1 → ϕ)
from the proof of Theorem 7.3. Again, fix a fresh p not occurring in ψ. Then the
following formulas are theorems of LI :
¬ψ → ♦· l(c ∧ ♦· l¬ψ);
(c ∧ ♦· l¬ψ)→ (α1(α1p→ p)→ p)).
The proof can now be completed using Theorem 5.1 in the same way as we did in the
proof of Theorem 7.3.
Case (single◦): L 6⊆ Ver, i.e., D ⊆ L ⊆ Triv. The only difference in the definition of F ◦I
is the use of R◦I := R
•
I ∪ {〈e, e〉}. Now, just like in the proof of Theorem 7.4, we cannot
use variable-free formulas to name points. We begin by recalling the “large enough” l
(say, 2 · t+ 4) from the previous case and letting q, r be fresh for ϕ. Define
d0(q) := (♦·
l¬q ∧ ♦ ⊡l q) ∨ (♦· lq ∧ ♦ ⊡l ¬q)
di+1(q) := ♦di(q) ∧ ¬di(q) ∧
∧
j<i
¬♦· dj(q).
Now reuse the same αi and γ as above to define
ai(q) := αi(dt(q)) and c(q) := γ(dt(q)),
and just as in the proof of Theorem 7.4, note that if
ζ(q) := ♦· lq ∧ ♦· l¬q
is satisfied in an admissible model M based on F ◦I , then ai(q) does the job of a unique
name, i.e., if Jζ(q)KM 6= ∅, then Jai(q)K
M = {ai}.
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Define LI := {ψ ∈ L | F
◦
I  ψ}. Since for any i > 1,
ζ(q)→ ⊡l((ai(q) ∧ ♦·
l¬ϕ)→ r) ∨⊡l((ai(q) ∧ ♦·
l¬ϕ)→ ¬r)
belongs to LI iff i 6∈ I, we have a continuum of distinct logics.
Again, we want to show that whenever A ∈ V validates LI , it also validates L. Assume
otherwise, i.e., that there is a ψ ∈ L such that A 2 ψ; using reasoning analogous to
that in the (single•) case we get that ψ ∈ Triv. Let var(ψ) be the collection of all free
variables in ψ. The following formula holds in F ◦I :
¬ψ →
∨
q∈var(ψ)
ζ(q).
(Assume it does not. Then there exists an admissible valuation refuting ψ such that
the denotations of variables in var(ψ) are either empty or equal to W ′I . But then this
countermodel for ψ can be collapsed to a single reflexive point, a contradiction). Fix a
fresh p and define
qα1ϕ := (♦· a1(q)→ ϕ).
Then the following formulas are theorems of LI :
¬ψ ∧
∨
q∈var(ψ)
ζ(q)→ ♦· l(♦· l¬ψ ∧
∨
q∈var(ψ)
(ζ(q) ∧ c(q)));
♦· l¬ψ ∧ ζ(q) ∧ c(q)→ (qα1(
q
α1
p→ p)→ p)).
The proof can now be completed using Theorem 5.1 in the same way as we did in the
proof of Theorem 7.4. ⊣
7.4 The Polymodal Case
We stated and proved the Blok Dichotomy for unimodal logics, but this was only for
technical and notational convenience. It is possible to adjust the proof to the polymodal
setting by following Litak 2008, even though Makinson’s Theorem does not hold in the
signature with more than one modality. As discussed in Litak 2008, § 3, one needs to use
the Minimal Variety Theorem instead, which generalizes Makinson’s result. We refer
the reader to Litak 2008 for all the details.
7.5 Degrees of Relative Incompleteness
An intriguing if somewhat esoteric question is to investigate degrees of relative in-
completeness: given classes K1 and K2 of baos, let us say that the degree of K1-
incompleteness relative to K2 of a normal modal logic L is the cardinality of the set
of logics L′ such that L′ is K2-complete and L and L
′ are valid over exactly the same
K1-baos. To motivate such comparisons, recall that many of the algebraic completeness
notions have frame-theoretic equivalents: CA-completeness is equivalent to complete-
ness with respect to normal neighborhood frames as in Dosˇen 1989; AV-completeness is
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equivalent to completeness with respect to discrete frames as in ten Cate and Litak 2007;
CV-completeness is equivalent to completeness with respect to full possibility frames as
in Holliday 2015; and V-completeness is equivalent to completeness with respect to prin-
cipal possibility frames as in Holliday 2015. Degrees of relative incompleteness can be
seen as providing a measure of how fine-grained these alternative modal semantics are
relative to each other and to Kripke semantics.
In fact, techniques used here (and in earlier references) allow us to investigate some of
these degrees of relative incompleteness. Let us briefly sketch the form of such proofs,
leaving details as exercises for interested readers. In the presence of relatively strong
consequences of the Axiom of Choice such as BPI, we can use the same trick as in the
proofs of Theorem 6.1 and Corollary 6.2 (and in Wolter 1993, § 4.6 or in Litak 2005a,
§ 4.4) to transfer sequences of frames VBI (proof of Theorem 7.3) and VB
◦
I (proof of
Theorem 7.4) into (general-frame duals of) neighborhood frames. In this way, we can
show that for Triv and Ver, their degree of V-incompleteness relative to CA is equal
to continuum. Pushing matters further, we can similarly transform the sequences F •I
and F ◦I used in the proof of Theorem 7.5 to show that a similar result obtains for any
neighborhood-complete L. It is somewhat more problematic to generalize this reasoning
to logics that are not necessarily neighborhood-complete: one would need to use LCA, the
CA-closure of L (the smallest neighborhood-complete logic containing L), and adjust the
definition of LI to {ψ ∈ L
CA | F •I  ψ} or {ψ ∈ L
CA | F ◦I  ψ}, depending on whether
(single•) or (single◦) holds. There seems to be, however, no guarantee that LCA will be
sound over the same class of V-baos as L. So the strongest form of the V-Dichotomy
relative to CA that we can show at present would be restricted to those L for which such
a conservativity condition holds—in particular, neighborhood-complete ones.
In the reverse direction, we can show similar results about degrees of ωC-incompleteness
relative to, e.g., AV (duals of discrete frames) using techniques from Litak 2008. The
key observation is that the general frames used in the proofs of corresponding variants
of the Blok Dichotomy use all finite and cofinite sets as the collection of admissible sets;
that is, they are (duals of) AV-baos. Again, one can state a ωC-Dichotomy relative to
AV restricted to those L for which a corresponding AV-conservativity condition holds:
their minimal nominal extension (see § 8.2 and Litak 2006) is sound with respect to
the same class of ωC-baos. In particular, this covers all AV-complete logics, i.e., those
whose minimal nominal extension is conservative.
8 Strengthening the Inference System
In this and the next section, we return to the theme of van Benthem 1979: turning
semantic incompleteness results into syntactic non-conservativity results. In van Ben-
them’s example, the formula ♦⊤ → ⊥ is not derivable from the vB-axiom according
to the derivability relation ⊢mnu
K
of § 2, or equivalently, it does not belong to the normal
modal logic vB, but the derivation is possible in relatively weak extensions of the logic.
We can already see this abstractly: as observed in § 6.3, there exists a derivability rela-
tion with a decidable notion of proof that exactly matches V-consequence, so by § 5.1,
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♦⊤ → ⊥ is derivable from the vB-axiom in this sense. However, we would like to
see non-conservativity in more concretely-given logics. As it turns out, there are several
well-motivated extensions that can be used for this purpose.
In the present section, we discuss derivations in existing calculi. The first of these,
weak second-order logic (§ 8.1), was proposed in van Benthem’s [1979] paper. Despite its
illuminating character, for our purposes it would be nice not to switch from the modal
language to an altogether different syntax. One can derive the problematic formula
in much weaker calculi that are well known in the modal community, namely, a basic
nominal calculus in § 8.2 and the tense calculus in § 8.3. For us, their importance comes
from the fact that they characterize consequence over classes of algebras narrower than
the class of V-baos: AV-baos in the nominal case and T -baos in the tense case.
8.1 Weak Second-Order Logic
We begin with the extension van Benthem considered: weak second-order logic. As
suggested in § 1, the idea is to translate formulas ϕ of the modal language into formulas
SO(ϕ) of the monadic second-order language with a single binary relation symbol—and
then deduce SO(♦⊤ → ⊥) from SO(vB-axiom) in some second-order calculus, guided
by the informal proof that every Kripke frame that validates vB validates ♦⊤ → ⊥
(Lemma 2.1). For a ϕ containing propositional variables p1, . . . , pn, SO(ϕ) is defined as
∀P1 . . . ∀Pn∀xSTx(ϕ) where the standard translation STx(ϕ) of ϕ is defined recursively
as usual, with the key clauses STx(pi) = Pix and STx(ϕ) = ∀y(Rxy → STy(ϕ)) where
y is a fresh variable. What van Benthem calls ‘weak second-order logic’ is the deductive
system for the monadic second-order language that extends a complete axiomatic system
for first-order logic with the following axioms for the monadic second-order quantifier:
• ∀P (ϕ→ ψ)→ (∀Pϕ→ ∀Pψ);
• ϕ→ ∀Pϕ where P does not occur free in ϕ;
• ∀Pϕ → ϕ[ψ/P ] where ψ is a first-order formula having some free variable x such
that ϕ[ψ/P ] is the result of replacing subformulas of the form Pu by ψ[u/x], subject
to the usual qualifications about free and bound variables.
To see that SO(♦⊤ → ⊥) is derivable from SO(vB-axiom) in this weak second-order
logic, first observe that SO(vB-axiom) = SO(♦⊤ → ((p→ p)→ p)) is
∀P
(
∀x(Rxy → ∃z(Ryz ∧ ⊤))→
∀y
(
Rxy →
(
∀z
(
Ryz →
(
∀u(Rzu→ Pu)→ Pz
))
→ Py
)))
.
Using the third of the second-order axioms, we can remove the ∀P and substitute v 6= y
for Pv, for each variable v, to obtain:
∀x(Rxy → ∃z(Ryz ∧⊤))→
∀y
(
Rxy →
(
∀z
(
Ryz →
(
∀u(Rzu→ u 6= y)→ z 6= y
))
→ y 6= y
))
.
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Then it is straightforward to derive SO(♦⊤ → ⊥), which is equivalent to
∀x(∀y(Rxy → ∃zRyz)→ ∀y¬Rxy),
by a formalized version of the proof of Lemma 2.1. Thus, although the modal relation
⊢mnu
K
of § 2 is too weak to derive ♦⊤ → ⊥ from the vB-axiom, the weakest reasonable
system of second-order logic is enough to do so under translation.
As van Benthem [1978] observed, the relation ⊢wso of derivability in weak second-order
logic axiomatizes a natural notion of semantic consequence. Interpret the second-order
language with a binary relation symbol in general frames G = 〈W,R,W〉 where 〈W,R〉 is
a Kripke frame andW ⊆ ℘(W ) is closed under first-order definability: given any formula
ϕ of the second-order language whose free individual variables are x, x1, . . . , xn, whose
free predicate variables are X1, . . . ,Xm, and which does not contain any second-order
quantifiers, if w1, . . . , wn ∈W and A1, . . . , Am ∈W, then
{w ∈W | G  ϕ[w,w1, . . . , wn, A1, . . . , Am]} ∈W.
Define the consequence relation wso by: Σ wso ϕ iff for all general frames G as above
and all variables assignments f mapping individual variables to elements of W and
predicate variables to elements of W, if G  σ[f ] for every σ ∈ Σ, then G  ϕ[f ]. Then
one can show the following.
Proposition 8.1. Σ ⊢wso ϕ iff Σ wso ϕ.
Thus, like V-consequence (recall § 6.3), the relation wso is recursively axiomatizable.
It is noteworthy that the baos underlying the general frames for weak second-order
logic above are AT -baos. The A part is obvious, since W must contain all singleton
subsets of W by the requirement of closure under definability. For the T part, where
the bao operator ♦ is given by ♦A = R−1[A] for A ∈ W, its residual h is given by
hA = {w ∈ W | R−1(w) ⊆ A}. This is clearly definable as above, and it is easy to see
that for any A,B ∈ W, we have ♦A ⊆ B iff A ⊆ hB. This shows that the underlying
bao is a T -bao (and hence a V-bao). Thus, for any σ and ϕ such that σ AT ϕ, we
also have SO(σ) wso SO(ϕ) and hence SO(σ) ⊢wso SO(ϕ) by Proposition 8.1.
8.2 Minimal Nominal Extension
Let H be a propositional modal language with two types of atomic formulas: proposi-
tional variables p, q, r . . . , and nominals i, j, k . . . (cf. Footnote 5). In the intended
Kripke semantics, the difference between propositional variables and nominals is that
nominals must be evaluated as singleton sets instead of arbitrary subsets.
A nominal modal logic is a set L of formulas of the language H that satisfies the con-
ditions of a normal modal logic (with uniform substitution of formulas for propositional
variables, but not for nominals) and the following:
(a) L is closed under uniform substitution of nominals for nominals;
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(b) for every n ∈ N and nominal i, ≤n(i→ ϕ)∨≤n(i→ ¬ϕ) ∈ L, where≤nϕ := ϕ∧
ϕ ∧ · · · ∧nϕ;
(c) if ℓ(¬i) ∈ L for all nominals i, then ℓ(⊥) ∈ L,
where l is any necessity form, defined as follows. Fixing a symbol ♮ not occurring in
formulas of H, the set of necessity forms is the smallest set containing ♮ such that for all
necessity forms ℓ(♮) and ϕ ∈ H, both (ϕ → ℓ(♮)) and l(♮) are also necessity forms.28
In the statement of condition (c), ℓ(ϕ) is the formula of H obtained by substituting ϕ
for ♮ in ℓ(♮). The condition (c) is the COV rule of Gargov and Goranko 1993.
Let the minimal nominal extension L.n of a normal unimodal logic L be the smallest
nominal modal logic that includes L. Ten Cate and Litak [2007] showed that conserva-
tivity of L.n over L is equivalent to L being the logic of some class of discrete general
frames—general frames in which every singleton subset is admissible—and that discrete
frames are duals of AV-baos, which yields the following.
Proposition 8.2 (Ten Cate and Litak). A normal modal logic L is AV-complete iff L.n
is a conservative extension of L.
Since the logic vB is V-incomplete and hence AV-incomplete, it follows from Proposi-
tion 8.2 that its minimal nominal extension vB.n is not a conservative extension. Indeed,
it is easy to show that ♦⊤ → ⊥ belongs to vB.n. First observe that by condition (b)
above, the smallest nominal modal logic contains i→ (i→ ♦i) and hence
(i→ (i→ ♦i)).
Then as an instance of the vB-axiom with the conditional in the consequent contraposed,
we have
♦⊤ → (i→ ♦(i ∧¬i)) ∈ vB.n.
Using the normality of , the two formulas above yield:
♦⊤ → ¬i ∈ vB.n,
whence ♦⊤ → ⊥ ∈ vB.n by the COV rule.
8.3 Minimal Tense Extension
The minimal tense extension L.t of a normal unimodal logic L is the smallest normal
bimodal logic including L and the axioms p → ♦−1p and p → −1♦p, where ♦−1 and
−1 are the new pair of modal operators.
The following analogue of Proposition 8.2 for T -baos is easy to see, given that the
Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of L.t is always a T -bao.
28The leading occurrence of  in the ℓ(♮) clause and in all necessity forms built using ℓ(♮) will be
called a principal one. This will matter when considering polymodal generalizations, e.g., in § 9.2.
41
Proposition 8.3. A normal modal logic L is T -complete iff L.t is a conservative exten-
sion of L.
Since the logic vB is V-incomplete and hence T -incomplete, it follows from Proposi-
tion 8.3 that its minimal tense extension vB.t is not a conservative extension. That
a tense extension may fail to be conservative is fascinating (see Wolter 1993, §5.4;
Kracht and Wolter 1997, §3.3; Goldblatt 2001, p. 170), especially when one looks at
a concrete derivation. We will sketch such a derivation, using the metatheorem for all
tense logics that  and ♦−1 are residuals, so ϕ → ψ is a theorem iff ♦−1ϕ → ψ is a
theorem. Where χ := ♦−1♦⊤, we have the following theorems of vB.t:
0. ♦⊤ → ((¬χ→ ¬χ)→ ¬χ) instance of vB-axiom
1. ♦⊤ → ♦−1♦⊤ instance of tense axiom
2. ♦⊤ → χ from 1 by definition of χ
3. ♦⊤ → (¬(¬χ→ ¬χ)) from 0 and 2 by normal modal reasoning
4. ♦−1♦⊤ → ¬(¬χ→ ¬χ) from 3 by residuation
5. χ→ ¬(¬χ→ ¬χ) from 4 by definition of χ
6. χ→ ♦(χ ∧¬χ) rewriting 5
7. χ→ ♦(♦(χ ∧¬χ) ∧¬χ) from 6 by normal modal reasoning
8. χ→ ⊥ from 7 by normal modal reasoning
9. ♦−1♦⊤ → ⊥ from 8 by definition of χ
10. ♦⊤ → ⊥ from 9 by residuation.
But ♦⊤ → ⊥ 6∈ vB by Lemma 2.3, so vB.t is not a conservative extension.29
9 Toward a Syntactic Characterization of V-Consequence
In § 8, we saw how existing calculi and rules characterizing consequence over narrower
classes of algebras allow us to show the incompleteness of vB. In this section, we are going
to discuss new extensions of the deductive apparatus that are sound for V-consequence
and also allow us to prove the incompleteness of vB and GLB. Our rule(s) are inspired
by the reformulation of complete additivity as condition R in § 4. In particular, it will
be convenient to work with the following obviously equivalent version of R.
Lemma 9.1. The condition R is equivalent to: for all a, b ∈ A, if for all c ∈ A such
that b ≤ c < ⊤, there is a d ∈ A such that c ≤ d < ⊤ and a ≤ d, then a ≤ b.
29An intriguing fact observed by Humberstone [2011, p. 870] is that ♦⊤ → ⊥ can be derived from
the vB-axiom using the so-called Hallde´n necessitation rule.
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This if . . . then has the feel of an inference rule that we could try to write in a modal
language. We will start by showing how this can be done in a rather expressive modal
language. Then we will gradually limit expressivity, finally achieving rule(s) expressible
in the plain modal syntax, yet still sufficient for incompleteness proofs.
9.1 Extended Languages
The first language we will consider is the language LGQM of Global Quantificational
Modalities [Holliday and Litak, 2018], given by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | ϕ | [∀p]ϕ | [∃p]ϕ.
Before we give a formal semantics, or even some intuition for these quantificational
modalities, let us introduce the other language we are concerned with in this subsection:
L(A), the extension of the basic unimodal language with the universal modality A. The
dual of A, the existential modality E, is defined as usual by Eϕ := ¬A¬ϕ. For a normal
unimodal logic L, let L.A be the smallest bimodal logic—with modalities  and A—that
extends L with the S5 axioms for A and the axiom Ap→ p. Note that L.A is always a
conservative extension of L: a modal algebra validating L becomes an algebra validating
L.A with the interpretation θˆ(Aϕ) as ⊤ if θˆ(ϕ) = ⊤ and ⊥ otherwise.
Let us now return to LGQM. The intended semantics for [∀p] is the same as for
∀pAϕ. The intended semantics for [∃p]ϕ is the same as for ∃pAϕ (note that we are using
the universal modality here as well, not its dual!). In a bao, we have the following
interpretations:
θˆ([∀p]ϕ) =
{
⊤ if θ̂′(ϕ) = ⊤ for all θ′ that differ from θ at most at p
⊥ otherwise
θˆ([∃p]ϕ) =
{
⊤ if θ̂′(ϕ) = ⊤ for some θ′ that differs from θ at most at p
⊥ otherwise.
.
LGQM is clearly more expressive than L(A): the universal modality A can be defined
by Aϕ := [∀p]ϕ where p does not occur in ϕ. But just like L(A), LGQM can still be inter-
preted in any algebra. This distinguishes LGQM from typical modal languages involving
propositional quantifiers: such quantifiers are normally interpreted using infinite opera-
tions, which poses problems in the absence of lattice-completeness. For more on LGQM,
its semantics, axiomatization, and expressive power, see Holliday and Litak 2018.
The version of R in Lemma 9.1 can be directly translated into a sentence of LGQM:
[∀p][∃q]
((
A(β → p) ∧ E¬p
)
→
(
A(p→ q) ∧ E¬q ∧ A(α→ q)
))
→ A(α→ β).
In order to arrive at a principle expressible in L(A), let us first weaken the above axiom
to a rule:
[∀p][∃q]
((
A(β → p) ∧ E¬p
)
→
(
A(p→ q) ∧ E¬q ∧ A(α→ q)
))
α→ β
.
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While the rule is easy to understand semantically, it is not very convenient to work
with in deductions. One would need to use contraposition with almost every conceivable
implication. So there is another version of the rule, where E and ¬ do not occur, yielding
something more interesting from a constructive point of view:
[∀p][∃q]
(
A(β → p)→
(
Ap ∨
(
A(p→ q) ∧ (Aq → Ap) ∧ A(α→ q)
)))
α→ β
.
A natural strategy to obtain a corresponding rule in pure L(A) is to use suitable
freshness assumptions, which we will write using nominal-logic-like notation [Pitts, 2013,
2016] (cf. Footnote 5), with ‘p#α, β’ (p is for fresh for α, β) meaning that p does not
occur in α, β:(
A(β → p) ∧ E¬p
)
→
(
A(p→ χ(p)) ∧ E¬χ(p) ∧ A(α→ χ(p))
)
p#α, β
α→ β
. (V-inf)
By writing ‘χ(p)’, we are only stressing that p can occur in χ (unlike in α or β), not
that it must. Let us show that V-inf preserves validity over any V-bao.
Proposition 9.2. The inference rule V-inf preserves validity over any V-bao.
Proof. Given a V-bao A, suppose A validates the premise of the rule, and consider any
valuation θ for A. We claim that θˆ(α→ β) = ⊤. Take any c ∈ A such that θˆ(β) ≤ c <
⊤. Let θ′ be the valuation that differs from θ at most at p such that θ′(p) = c. Since p
does not occur in β, θˆ(β) = θ̂′(β), so θ̂′(β) ≤ c < ⊤. Then by the assumption that the
premise of the rule is valid, we have c ≤ θ̂′(χ(p)) < ⊤ and θ̂′(α) ≤ θ̂′(χ(p)) = θ̂′(χ(p)).
Let d := θ̂′(χ(p)). Since p does not occur in α, θ̂′(α) = θˆ(α) ≤ d. So we have shown
that for any c ∈ A such that θˆ(β) ≤ c < ⊤, there is a d ∈ A such that c ≤ d < ⊤ and
θˆ(α) ≤ d. Then by the reformulation of R in Lemma 9.1, θˆ(α) ≤ θˆ(β) = θˆ(β), so
θˆ(α→ β) = ⊤, as claimed. Thus, the conclusion of the rule is valid over A. ⊣
Proposition 9.2 shows that if a normal modal logic L is V-complete, then the minimal
normal extension of L.A that is closed under the rule V-inf is a conservative extension
of L. By contraposition, to show the failure of V-completeness, it suffices to show the
failure of conservativity.
As above, we have two subtly differing syntactic variants. The statement of V-inf
above is the semantically convenient version of the rule, whereas deductively (and con-
structively) one may have some preference for
A(β → p)→
(
Ap ∨
(
A(p→ χ(p)) ∧ (Aχ(p)→ Ap) ∧ A(α→ χ(p))
))
p#α, β
α→ β
.
However, the premise of this variant still does not look particularly appealing. In fact,
for our purposes we can use a simpler special instance:
p→ χ(p) Aχ(p)→ Ap α→ χ(p) p#α
α→ ⊥
. (V-spec)
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If the premises of V-spec are valid over a bao A, then the premise of V-inf is also valid
over A with β := ⊥; so if A is a V-bao, then the conclusion α→ ⊥ is valid over A.
Let us use V-spec to derive ♦⊤ → ⊥ from the vB-axiom
♦⊤ → ((p→ p)→ p).
We take α := ♦⊤ and choose χ(p) := (p → p) → p. Our rule says that to derive
α→ ⊥, we need to show that the following three formulas are theorems of vB.A:
(a) p→ ((p→ p)→ p) (b) A((p→ p)→ p)→ Ap (c) vB.
Premise (c) is an axiom. Premise (a) is a theorem of K and thus a fortiori of vB.A.
Premise (b) is a theorem of K.A. Its derivation is the only place where we use axioms
for the universal modality. For we have
⊢K.A A((p→ p)→ p)→ A(p→ p),
which with the theorem Aq → Aq gives us
⊢K.A A((p→ p)→ p)→ A(p→ p),
which with the axiom A(q → r)→ (Aq → Ar) yields the desired
⊢K.A A((p→ p)→ p)→ Ap.
We can go even further: there is a still more special instance of our rule, which does
not use the universal modality at all and yet is sufficient both for the vB deduction above
and for the GLB incompleteness result.
9.2 Pure Modal Syntax
To eliminate the universal modality from V-spec, we can replace Aχ(p) → Ap by any
stronger formula, i.e., any formula whose validity over a bao implies that of Aχ(p)→ Ap;
the resulting rule will still be V-sound. As we now want a rule that will work for GLB as
well, let us formulate it in a polymodal syntax. The first rule V-mod that we present is
an instance of a V-sound rule scheme Vℓ-mod that we will see at the end of this section;
however, we do not need full generality to cover vB and GLB at the same time.
Recall again that ⊡iα := α∧iα. Our example of a V-sound rule without the universal
modality is:
p→ χ(p) ⊡iχ(p)→ p α→ jχ(p) p#α
α→ j⊥
. (V-mod)
In the unimodal case, take i = j. This yields a purely unimodal rule that preserves
validity over any V-bao and suffices to carry out van Benthem’s deduction. We leave
adjusting the deduction from § 9.1 so that V-mod replaces V-spec as an exercise.
It seems more interesting to note that V-mod can be used to translate the algebraic
reasoning in the proof of Theorem 5.4 for GLB, in order to derive [1]⊥. Let i := 0, j := 1,
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and α := ⊤, so the conclusion of V-mod becomes [1]⊥. As in the derivation for vB in
§ 9.1, set χ(p) := [0]([0]p → p) → p. Then since α := ⊤, the third premise of V-mod
becomes
[1]([0]([0]p → p)→ p),
which is a bimodal version of the vB-axiom. Let us show that this is indeed a theorem
of GLB. First, note the well-known fact that ⊢GLB [1]([0]p → p) (In order to derive this,
start with ⊢GLB [1]〈0〉¬p∨ 〈1〉[0]p by excluded middle, which implies ⊢GLB [1]〈0〉¬p∨ [0]p
and then ⊢GLB [1]〈0〉¬p ∨ [1]p by axioms (iii) and (ii) of GLB, which in turn implies
⊢GLB [1](〈0〉¬p ∨ p).) Then we have:
⊢GLB [0]([0]p → p)→ [0]p Lo¨b axiom
⊢GLB [1]([0]([0]p → p)→ [0]p) by Necessitation
⊢GLB [1]([0]p → p) from above
⊢GLB [1]([0]([0]p → p)→ p) from previous two steps using normality of [1].
Turning to the first and second premises of V-mod, as in the case of vB, these can
be shown to be theorems of unimodal K, i.e., in the language with [0] only. As the
K-theoremhood of the second premise may be less immediate to see, let us sketch this
derivation (returning to the unimodal syntax). We want to show
⊢K ⊡((p→ p)→ p)→ p.
First, one can easily derive
⊢K ((p→ p)→ p)→ (p→ p).
By normality, this also yields
⊢K ((p→ p)→ p)→ (p→ p).
Now it is enough to recall the definition of ⊡ to obtain
⊢K ⊡((p→ p)→ p)→
(
(p→ p) ∧ ((p→ p)→ p)
)
and finish the derivation. Thus, we have shown that all three premises of V-mod are
theorems of GLB. So V-mod allows us to derive the V-consequence [1]⊥ of GLB.
Since V-mod is V-sound and hence T -sound, it is admissible in tense logics (recall
§ 8.3). We will conclude this section by showing syntactically that V-mod is admissible
in tense logics with two future box modalities i and j (which may be the same) as in
the statement of V-mod. Substitute −1j ¬α for p in the premises of V-mod. Then we
deduce the conclusion of V-mod as follows:
1. ⊡iχ(
−1
j ¬α)→ 
−1
j ¬α second premise of V-mod
2. ♦j ⊡i χ(
−1
j ¬α)→ ¬α from 1 by residuation
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3. α→ j¬
(
χ(−1j ¬α) ∧iχ(
−1
j ¬α)
)
from 2 by contraposition, definition of ⊡
4. α→ jχ(
−1
j ¬α) third premise of V-mod
5. α→ j♦i¬χ(
−1
i ¬α) from 3 and 4
6. ♦−1j α→ χ(
−1
j ¬α) from 4 by residuation
7. ¬χ(−1j ¬α)→ ♦
−1
j α contrapositive of first premise of V-mod
8. ¬χ(−1j ¬α)→ ⊥ from 6 and 7
9. ♦i¬χ(
−1
j ¬α)→ ⊥ from 8
10. α→ j⊥ from 5 and 9.
The rule V-mod seems too specialized to cherish hopes that it might yield the ultimate
syntactic characterization of V-completeness via its conservativity. At least, however, its
conservativity over the set of theorems of a given modal logic is a necessary condition for
the V-completeness of the logic. Moreover, as mentioned above, it can be significantly
generalized. Let ℓ(♮), ℓ1(♮), . . . , ℓn(♮) be necessity forms as defined in § 8.2, suitably
adjusted to the polymodal language. Furthermore, assume ℓ(♮) does not involve p. In
the polymodal setting, we require that if only some of the diamonds are completely
additive, then only the corresponding boxes can occur in ℓ(♮) in principal positions
(recall Footnote 28). Consider the following rule scheme:30
p→ χ(p) ℓ1(χ(p))→ · · · → ℓn(χ(p))→ p ℓ(χ(p)) p#ℓ
ℓ(⊥)
. (Vℓ-mod)
To see V-mod as an instance of Vℓ-mod, set ℓ1(♮) := ♮, ℓ2(♮) := i♮, and ℓ(♮) := α→ j♮.
To justify Vℓ-mod as a corollary of V-spec in the same way as we justified V-mod at the
beginning of this subsection, note that ⊢K.A Ap → ℓi(p) and that the assumption that
V-boxes appear principally in ℓ(♮) turns it into a term-definable V-box.
We leave the question of whether conservativity of a rule scheme like Vℓ-mod can
provide a necessary-and-sufficient characterization of V-completeness for future work.
10 Conclusions and Future Work
We have shown the existence of V-incomplete logics (in the unimodal signature) and V-
inconsistent logics (in a polymodal signature), thus answering a long-standing open ques-
tion (Litak 2004, Litak 2005b, Ch. 9, Venema 2007, § 6.1, Litak 2008, § 7). These results
contrast with the fact that for many natural logics, even their countably generated free
algebra can be completely additive (cf. Footnote 13). Moreover, the examples involved
30For the second premise, recall that implication associates to the right.
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turn out to be surprisingly natural. One of them is the logic vB designed by van Benthem
[1979] to extract the syntactic essence of incompleteness results. Still more strikingly,
another example is provided by the bimodal provability logic GLB [Japaridze, 1988,
Boolos, 1993, Beklemishev et al., 2010, Beklemishev, 2011]. These V-incompleteness re-
sults essentially relied on a reformulation of V as a first-order ∀∃∀-property inspired by
the work of the first author on modal possibility frames, which also allows a concrete
description of categories dual to categories of V-baos [Holliday, 2015].
The vB axiom and the general frame used by van Benthem [1979] have often been
reused in proofs of the Blok Dichotomy for various generalizations of Kripke com-
pleteness [Chagrov and Zakharyaschev, 1997, Zakharyaschev et al., 2001, Litak, 2005b,
Rautenberg et al., 2006, Wolter and Zakharyaschev, 2006, Litak, 2008]. We have shown
that this strategy extends smoothly to degrees of V-incompleteness.
We were also able to follow a less frequented path opened up by van Benthem [1979]
and investigate syntactic aspects of incompleteness proofs. Apart from several extended
modal formalisms in which to internalize incompleteness arguments, from the nominal
and tense formalisms to LGQM (Global Quantificational Modalities, investigated further
in Holliday and Litak 2018), we have presented a single, surprisingly simple non-standard
rule V-mod in a pure modal language (generalizing further to a rule scheme Vℓ-mod),
which is admissible over V-baos and can be used to show the V-incompleteness of both
the van Benthem logic and GLB.
These results raise a number of further questions. First, we still need to provide a
definite characterization of V-completeness in terms of conservativity of suitable minimal
extensions, similar to those available in the earlier literature for AV-completeness or T -
completeness (nominal and tense extensions, respectively), preferably in a language not
involving quantifiers or global quantificational modalities.
Second, while we are very satisfied with GLB as a natural example of V-incompleteness,
we would like to see an equally striking case of V-inconsistency. Recall that one of our
present examples of V-inconsistency is GLBe, which can be naturally interpreted using
ordinal semantics of polymodal provability logics [Beklemishev et al., 2010, Beklemishev,
2011]. Can this logic or an extension thereof be given a good provability interpretation?
Or is there another route to explore?
Third, while we believe that the syntactic “internalization” of incompleteness proofs
we proposed—i.e., investigating relevant derivations in (extended) modal formalisms—
is a fruitful and natural perspective, it could and perhaps should be complemented
with an approach more directly following that of van Benthem [1979]. Recall that
van Benthem proposed using weak second-order logic as the ambient formalism. In
our setting, this would amount to characterizing V-, AV-, T -consequence and their
relatives by allowing very limited instances of the axioms of weak second-order logic
(e.g., involving equalities, relational atoms with variables permuted, etc.) plus possibly
some additional axioms/rules. Matching this with the “internalized” approach above
would lead to a fine-grained perspective on (extended) correspondence theory.
Fourth, when briefly discussing the subject of degress of relative incompleteness in
§ 7.5, we recalled the fact that many of the algebraic completeness notions have frame-
theoretic equivalents, involving normal neighborhood frames [Dosˇen, 1989], discrete
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frames [ten Cate and Litak, 2007], or possibility frames [Holliday, 2015]. Are there other
ways of systematically comparing these semantics and their associated completeness no-
tions, superior to studying degrees of relative incompleteness?31
Fifth, we would like to mention two problems brought up by participants of ToLo V
in Tbilisi, where this work was presented in June 2016. Do there exist natural prop-
erties of baos yielding notions of completeness properly intermediate between V- and
T -completeness? And is there a topological way of deriving the first-order characteriza-
tion of complete additivity for operators on arbitrary posets in Andre´ka et al. 2016?32
Finally, our present success should be an encouragement to revisit other open problems
regarding sub-Kripkean completeness posed by Litak [2004; 2005b, Ch. 9; 2008, § 7] and
others. For example, given the importance of transitive modal logics—normal extensions
of K4—it is natural to ask what incompleteness phenomena arise for these logics. We still
have no indication of the existence of any AT -incomplete transitive unimodal logics. It
might even be the case that van Benthem’s [1979] weak second-order consequence is con-
servative for them. There is also no indication that the Blok Dichotomy will generalize
to degrees of A-incompleteness. In fact, as discussed by Venema [2007] and Litak [2008],
a strong result by Buszkowski [1986, 2004] implying A-completeness of logics axiomatiz-
able by modally guarded axioms suggests that examples of A-incompleteness are few and
far between (note that the axiom of vB is modally guarded). Most importantly, we still
seem to have very few (if any) general results regarding sub-Kripkean completeness for
non-classical logics with a non-Boolean propositional base. Even Kuznetsov’s problem
[Kuznetsov, 1975] regarding topological completeness of superintuitionistic logics re-
mains open more than four decades after its formulation (see Bezhanishvili and Holliday
Forthcoming). We hope to see progress on these problems in the years ahead.
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